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The Sport industry has developed over the years and now can even form part of the 
entertainment industry. Sportspersons have become celebrities in their own right and 
their image rights are treated as commodities. The image rights of famous 
sportspersons are commercial products exploited by sports clubs and enterprises in 
promoting their brands through merchandising and endorsement deals. As a result, 
sportspersons earn income from the use of their image in promotional activities.  
The Income Tax Act No.58 of 1962 does not provide specific rules for the taxation of 
image rights payments and the Guide on the Taxation of Professional Sports Clubs 
and Players (the 2018 Guide) issued by the South African Revenue Service is not 
legally binding. Therefore, the income tax treatment of image rights payments is a 
subject of different interpretations and a cause for uncertainty. The capital or revenue 
nature (classification) of income from the sale or exploitation of image rights is unclear.  
The aim of this study was to determine the income tax classification of income derived 
by rugby, cricket and football players from the commercial exploitation of their image 
rights. The inquiry considered the regulations prescribed by the sport regulatory 
bodies, legislation, case law, literature and the section of the 2018 Guide which deals 
with image rights. A brief comparative study was also conducted to assess the tax 
position in the United Kingdom and United States of America.  
It was found that the South African law does not currently recognise an image right as 
a separable asset of an individual. Income emanates from the productive employment 
of an image right in lieu of its disposal therefore will form part of a sportspersons’ gross 
income.  
The 2018 Guide also does not sufficiently address the income tax implications of the 
sale or exploitation of image rights. There is, therefore, a need for a legislative 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Historical background of image rights in sport 
The second half of the twentieth century was marked by an unprecedented growth in 
the entertainment industry; not only as far as theatre, film, music and fashion was 
concerned, but also sport.1 Sport is now firmly part of the worldwide entertainment 
industry.2 
The growth and access to sport has created exposure for sportspersons and they have 
become celebrities in their own right.3 Sportspersons have become increasingly aware 
of the commercial value of their image rights and they do exploit their fame by entering 
into endorsement and merchandising deals.4 Images and physical attributes of 
sportspersons have suddenly become commodities.5 Sportspersons’ images and 
attributes are commodified through advertising and marketing of products and 
services.   
The commodification of sportspersons’ images has become prominent in recent years, 
however, it is not a new concept. The World International Property Organisation 
(WIPO) reports that former English soccer player, Kevin Keegan was the first sports 
personality in 1977 to actively enter into what was then known as a “face contract” for 
what was essentially his image right.6 In essence, the deal demonstrated the player’s 
notoriety beyond the pitch and his ability to sell merchandise.7 
The commercial exploitation of sportspersons’ attributes is also not new in South Africa 
but is still emerging. The emergence is attributable to the commercialisation of sport 
and the fame associated with sportspersons globally which has resulted, in a now 
recognised concept. Football followers would be familiar with the ‘Jomo Sono King 
Soccer Boots’. The soccer boots bear the term ‘Jomo Sono King’ and are a product of 
an endorsement deal between Puma South Africa and football legend Ephraim 
 
1 Cornelius, S. 2011. Image rights. In Handbook on international sports law. Nafziger, J. A. R. & Ross, 
S. F. Eds. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. p. 497. 
2 Blackshaw, I. 2012. Sports marketing agreements: legal, fiscal and practical aspects. The Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser. p. 254.  
3 Ibid. p. 255.   
4 Cloete, R. Ed. 2005. Introduction to sports law in South Africa. Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths. p 
175.   
5 Supra cite note 1.   
6 World International Property Organisation. 2015. Can you protect your image like your brand? 





Matsilele Sono – affectionately known as Jomo Sono. The endorsement deal was 
entered into during the legend’s playing days.8 This is one example which serves to 
illustrate how a sportsperson’s image rights can be commercially exploited.  
Cloete argues that the commercialisation of image rights and the subsequent increase 
in sportspersons’ value and income inevitably attracted the interest of the taxman.9 
Sportspersons’ images are used as a mechanism of marketing in order to influence 
consumer behaviour and ultimately promote product sales. 
The interest shown by the revenue authorities is justifiable due to the commercial 
element associated with the image right practice. The advertisers obtain benefit by 
increased sales of products and sportsperson benefit through a fee or royalty.10 The 
benefits obtained by both parties are of a commercial nature. This study is concerned 
with the income tax classification of the benefit received by or accrued to or in favour 
of a sportsperson.  
As noted above, the commercial exploitation of sportspersons’ image rights is a 
recognised concept. Notwithstanding this, the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (SAICA) recognises that tax issues in the sports industry have generally 
lagged behind other industries because of the paucity of the quantum of litigation, 
academic scholarship and legislative action devoted to it.11 
Consequently, South African income tax literature is limited with regard to commercial 
exploitation of sportspersons’ image rights. Section 1.2 below indicates the South 
African Revenue Services’ (SARS) current position of taxing image rights’ payments.  
1.2. Taxing of sportspersons’ image rights payments in South Africa 
Resident sportspersons are taxed under normal tax provisions prescribed in section 5 
of the Income Tax Act (ITA).12 The SARS issued a Guide on the Taxation of 
 
8 Kick Off. 2008. Puma will stand side-by-side with Jomo. Available: 
http://www.kickoff.com/news/3184/puma-will-stand-side-by-side-with-jomo. [2019, February 13] 
9 Cloete, R. 2012. The taxation of image rights: a comparative analysis. 45(3). p. 559. 
10 Cloete, R. Ed. 2005. Introduction to sports law in South Africa. Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths. p 
175.    
11 South African Institute of Chartered Accountants. 2013. Entertainers and sportspersons. Available: 
https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2013/2190._Entertainers_and_sports_persons.htm [2019, March 
17]. 




Professional Sports Clubs and Players (the 2018 Guide).13 The purpose of the Guide 
is to provide a guideline on the income tax implications for professional sports clubs 
and players in South Africa. The present study considers income tax implications for 
sportspersons in respect of image rights’ payments.  
The relevant section of the 2018 Guide provides that, payments made to a 
sportsperson for the right to use the sportsperson’s “image” rights will be included in 
the sportsperson’s gross income. The Guide further states that, should such a 
payment be made to a sportsperson by the club to whom the sportsperson is 
contracted, such payments will constitute “remuneration” for employees’ tax 
purposes.14  
The Guide is not an “official publication” or a general binding ruling as envisaged in 
the Tax Administration Act No. 28 of 2011 (the TAA) and it does not create practice 
generally prevailing in terms of section 5 of the TAA. Moreover, the inferences made 
in the Guide are not supported by authoritative case law since the issue has not been 
a subject of a higher court and there are no specific tax rules or provisions that deal 
specifically with image rights payments. As a result, it is a matter that is open to 
different interpretations and is therefore a cause for much uncertainty. 
1.3. Research problem  
The problem area identified is the current uncertainty with regard to the classification 
of income earned by sportspersons from the commercial exploitation of their image 
rights. The 2018 Guide serves as a good foundation to address uncertainty. However, 
the Guide does not delve into the precise technical and legal detail that is often 
associated with tax and therefore could not be used as legal reference.15 
Notwithstanding that a Guide is not a legal binding document, it is necessary to 
consider whether the inferences made therein are in accordance with the ITA and 
relevant case law.   
The critical element of classifying income between revenue or capital nature has not 
been sufficiently dealt with in the 2018 Guide. Moreover, the Guide does not 
 
13 South African Revenue Service. 2018. Guide on the Taxation of Professional Sports Clubs and 
Players. Available: http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/LAPD-Gen-G08%20-
%20Guide%20on%20the%20Taxation%20of%20Professional%20Sports%20Clubs%20and%20Playe
rs.pdf  [2019, February 4]. 
14 Ibid. p. 35.  




demonstrate which tests or guidelines that have been laid down by the courts were 
applied or should be applied to ascertain the nature of income earned from the 
commercial exploitation of image rights.  
Moreover, the relevant sport codes are governed by rules and regulations. It is 
therefore necessary to consider income tax implications in conjunction with the 
regulations prescribed by the regulatory bodies in respect of image rights. The income 
tax treatment of image rights payments may diverge depending on whether an image 
is exploited by a sport club or national sport association or an enterprise. The income 
tax consequences may also vary when a facet of an image that is exploited is 
recognised as property right under intellectual property law.    
1.4. Research objectives and motivation for study 
1.4.1. Research objectives 
This study seeks to investigate the classification of image rights for income tax 
purposes. The primarily focus being the nature of amounts earned by rugby, cricket 
and football players from the commercial exploitation of their image rights in 
promotional activities. Moreover, to explore the income tax implications arising from 
the protection of image rights under intellectual property law. The study is conducted 
through an analysis of the legislation, case law and literature relating to the 
classification of income and considers the relevant section of the 2018 Guide. The 
study also seeks to raise perspectives that have not been explored in this area and to 
contribute to the body of knowledge that should be considered to develop a legal 
income tax framework for taxing image rights payments.  
1.4.2. Motivation for study 
The public is exposed to advertisements through billboards, TV commercials and other 
forms of media. There is a notable number of sportspersons taking part in promotional 
activities through their image rights. It follows that it is necessary to consider and 
determine the classification of image rights payments in the hands of sportspersons. 
The inexistence of a legal tax framework in this regard leaves a gap in our tax system. 
The study justifies the need for a legal tax framework that addresses the classification 
of image right payments in the hands of sportspersons. A study on this topic is relevant 




1.5. Research questions 
The primary research question formulated to approach and guide this study is as 
follows: 
What is the nature of payments received by or accrued to or in favour of rugby, cricket 
and football players from the commercial exploitation of their image rights in 
promotional activities? 
To address the primary question, the following sub-questions are formulated:  
a) Does the payment made to sportspersons satisfy the requirements of gross 
income as defined in section 1 of the ITA? 
b) To the extent that an image right payment is considered to be income of a 
revenue nature, should the income be characterised as remuneration, business 
income, royalty fee, services or other income?  
1.6. Research Method 
A legal interpretative research will be adopted to conduct the study. A doctrinal 
research which provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular 
legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty 
and, perhaps, predicts future developments, will be applied. The research consists of 
a review and analysis of case laws, legislation and existing literature. Due to the nature 
of the study, a qualitative research method will be applied to address the research 
questions.   
Due to limited domestic literature in this area, the income tax perspective of the United 
Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA) has been considered for the 
purpose of comparative analysis. These countries are selected on the basis that they 
apply a residence-based tax system, have a capital gains tax and the availability of 
literature in respect of image rights payments as well as case law. The comparative 
study will be utilised to determine whether the income tax treatment of image rights by 
these countries could be considered in South Africa.  
The research data will be obtained through an internet search. The data includes 
legislation, case law, academic journals, website articles and textbooks that are 




1.7. Limitation of scope  
The study is limited to the classification of receipts or accruals in favour of resident 
rugby, cricket and football players, in respect of their image rights commercially 
exploited only in South Africa.  
Income tax implications for sports clubs, national sport associations, enterprises and 
sport regulatory bodies are not considered. Save for, how the sport regulating bodies 
provides for the accounting of image rights in standard player contracts, collective 
agreements and, or memorandum of understanding (MOU).  
1.8. Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 1 provides a brief historical background of image rights in sport and presents 
the research topic. The chapter also outlines the research problem, the research 
objectives and motivation for the study, the research questions, the research method 
adopted and limitation of scope. It also provides a brief overview of the chapters and 
structure of the dissertation.  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the image rights concept, its association with 
advertising and the definitions of key terms. The chapter further indicates how sport 
clubs, national sports associations and third-party enterprises commercially exploit 
image rights.  Moreover, this chapter considers how image rights are regulated.    
Chapter 3 considers the recognition and protection of image rights in South African 
law. The chapter further seeks to establish how image rights should be classified in 
terms of the accounting and income tax provisions.    
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the legislation and relevant case law for the 
classification of income earned by sportspersons from the commercial exploitation of 
their image rights.  
Chapter 5 firstly conducts a critical review of the 2018 Guide and examines the 
characterisation of income between remuneration, business income, royalty income, 
services or other income. Secondly, the chapter explores the practice of safeguarding 
image rights under intellectual property law and analyses the income tax 
consequences from the subsequent commercial exploitation thereof.   
Chapter 6 provides a UK and USA perspective in respect of the practice and taxation 




Chapter 7 concludes the study and provides a summary of findings and 
























Chapter 2: The concept of image rights and regulations 
2.1. Introduction 
Prior to determining the classification of image payments for income tax purposes, it 
is important to explain the concept of image rights and to define the key terms. 
Moreover, it is also necessary to demonstrate how image rights are associated with 
advertising in and outside of sport. The image rights regulations prescribed by sport 
governing bodies in their contractual agreements are also presented in this chapter. 
Above all, this chapter seeks to manifest how image rights are commercially exploited 
in advertising. It is critical to draw a distinction between the modes under which image 
rights are commercially exploited in order to determine appropriate classification of 
receipts or accruals in favour of sportspersons for income tax purposes.  
2.2. Understanding image rights and defining key terms 
2.2.1. Image rights 
International and domestic literature and case law are considered in this chapter in 
order to present the concept of image rights.  The integration is attributable to the fact 
that the concept is still emerging in South Africa and, as a result, the literature is 
limited.    
“Image” is defined as a representation of the external form of a person or thing in art, 
a visible impression obtained by a camera or other devices or displayed on a computer 
or video screen, semblance or likeness.16 The dictionary meaning only refers to the 
visual physical attributes of a person. Scholars in the field of sports law have 
expressed that the term “indicia” is appropriate to include non-physical aspects of an 
individual such as likeness, voice and nickname within the term “image”.17 In this 
study, the term “image” is used in relation to both physical and non-physical attributes 
of sportspersons.   
Image right is defined as:18 
 
16 “Image”. Stevenson, A. Ed. 2010. Oxford Dictionary of English. 3rded. Oxford: University Press. 
Available: 
http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/view/10.1093/acref/9780199571123.001.0001/m_e
n_gb0400680?rskey=1Fm1J8&result=1  [2019, February 16]. 
17 Harrington, D. & White, N. 2005. United Kingdom. In Sports Image Rights in Europe. Blackshaw, I.S. 
& Siekmann, R.C.R, Eds. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. 315 – 343. 





“The ability of an individual to exclusively control the commercial use of his name, 
physical/pictorial image, reputation, identity, voice, personality, signature, initials or 
nickname in advertisements, marketing and all other forms of media. The sportsperson 
on the other hand, often earns a substantial fee or royalty that is paid for the privilege 
of allowing his name to be used for promotional activities.” 
WIPO indicates that, the right to one’s own image is the ability to decide when, how 
and by whom one’s physically recognisable features (image, voice and name) can be 
captured, reproduced or published.19  
It can be deduced from these definitions that an image right is concerned with 
individuals’ right to identity and the exclusive right over the use of personal identity for 
commercial purposes.  
2.2.2. Resident 
The South African income tax system is residence-based. The residence of a 
sportsperson is important for this discussion. The ITA provides that a ‘resident’:20 
“means as any— 
   (a)  natural person who is— 
(i) ordinarily resident in the Republic; or 
(ii) not at any time during the relevant year of assessment ordinarily resident in the 
Republic, if that person was physically present in the Republic— 
(aa) for a period or periods exceeding 91 days in aggregate during the 
relevant year of assessment, as well as for a period or periods 
exceeding 91 days in aggregate during each of the five years of 
assessment preceding such year of assessment; and 
(bb) for a period or periods exceeding 915 days in aggregate during 
those five preceding years of assessment,” 
The term ‘ordinary resident’ is not defined in the ITA. However, it was established in 
Cohen v CIR21 that a person’s ordinary residence would be the country to which he 
 
19 World International Property Organisation. 2015. The Role of IP for Athletes and Image Rights. 
Available: 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_reg_ip_sport_sin_14/wipo_reg_ip_sport_sin_14_t_
11.pdf  [2019, March 20]. 
20 Section 1(1) of Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962. 




would naturally and as a matter of course return from his wanderings. This formulation 
was confirmed in CIR v Kuttel22 where the court held that, a person is ordinarily 
resident where he has his usual or principal residence that is what may be described 
as his real home. 
It is submitted that the sportspersons covered in this study are those that fall within the 
definition and criterion test above.   
2.2.3. Sportsperson 
A sportsperson is defined in section 47A of the ITA as follows:23 
“entertainer or sportsperson” includes any person who for reward— 
(i) performs any activity as a theatre, motion picture, radio or television 
artiste or a musician; 
(ii) takes part in any type of sport; or 
(iii) takes part in any other activity which is usually regarded as of an 
entertainment character” 
Professional sportspersons who participate in a team sport generally contract with 
professional sports clubs. Sportspersons get rewarded for their services rendered to 
the clubs.  
‘Sport’ is defined as “an activity involving physical exertion and skill in which an 
individual or team competes against another or others for entertainment”.24 It is 
submitted that rugby, cricket and football fall within the ambit of sport in the ordinary 
dictionary meaning. It follows that players participating in these sporting codes are 
regarded as sportspersons as defined in section 47A of the ITA.  
2.3. The commercialisation of sportspersons’ image rights 
Sport has transformed from a recreational activity to an industry on its own. The 
transformation is not confined to the physical act of performing but the 
commercialisation of sport is now part of the ‘game’. In the modern era, clubs do not 
rely on the traditional sale of tickets to generate income. Television broadcasting 
 
22 (1992) 54 SATC 298 (3) SA 242(A) at para 36. 
23 No. 58 of 1962. 
24 “Sport”. Stevenson, A. Ed. 2010. Oxford Dictionary of English. 3rded. Oxford: University Press. 
Available: 
http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/view/10.1093/acref/9780199571123.001.0001/m_e




rights, merchandise and sponsorships are means by which the clubs earn income. 
Television broadcasting rights do not only generate income for clubs but also create 
exposure for players and enhance their public profile.   
The leading stars use their public profiles to generate income25, apart from their 
professional career by availing their image rights for commercial exploitation. The main 
sources of income for players and athletes in the exploitation of their image rights are 
sponsorship, merchandising or licensing and endorsements.26 
Image rights are sought after by companies who wish to exploit them in order to 
promote their brand image, create brand awareness and promote the sale of their 
products.27 Wolohan reports that for most high profile athletes, endorsing products or 
lending their name to them, has become more lucrative than their professional playing 
contracts.28 Haynes states that, the elite of the world’s footballers, the superstars of 
the game, are now traded on this intangible value with the capture of their so-called 
‘‘image rights’’ central to any contractual negotiations between player, agents, club 
and national federation.29 In fact, the commercial exploitation of the image rights of 
famous sportspersons is big business.30 
The advertising world took notice of the popularity enjoyed by the stars and realised 
the value of associating merchandise or trademarks with superstars.31 The famous 
sportspersons appearing in promotional activities are recognisable by the public and 
it is mainly for this reason that enterprises associate with them in order to reach a vast 
audience. Sportsperson’s likeness can influence consumer’s interest in the product or 
service. Cloete argues that, the association of the name of a famous sportsperson with 
a product can increase product sales.32 
 
25 The word is used in its general meaning, not within the context of the Income Tax Act. 
26 Louw, A. 2012. Sports law in South Africa. 2nd ed. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 
464. 
27 Cloete, R. 2012. The taxation of image rights: A comparative analysis. 45(3). p. 556. 
28 Wolohan, J. 2005. United States. In Sports Image Rights in Europe. Blackshaw, I.S. & Siekmann, 
R.C.R, Eds. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. p. 345. 
29 Haynes, R. 2007. Footballers’ Image Rights in the New Media Age. European Sport Management 
Quarterly, 7(4):361–374. 
30 Colantuoni & Novazio. 2011. Intellectual property rights in sports: a comparative analysis of the USA, 
UK, and Italy. In Handbook on international sports law. Nafziger, J.A.R. & Ross, S.F. Nafziger, J.A.R. 
& Ross, S.F, Eds. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 429 – 459.   
31 Cornelius, S. 2011. Image rights. In Handbook on international sports law. Nafziger, J. A. R. & Ross, 
S. F. Eds. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. p. 497.  





The commercial element attached to the exploitation of image rights, raises a question 
whether every sportsperson has an image that is worthy or capable of commercial 
exploitation. Considering that images are typically exploited for the purpose of 
increasing sales, it is probable that promoters would seek to exploit images of the most 
famous or recognisable sportspersons. However, this may not invariable be the case 
when images are exploited by a sport club or national sport association in a team or 
group context.    
This present study does not intend to design a test which establishes the value that 
could be derived in advertising based on the fame or lack thereof of a sportsperson. 
However, it is trite that high profile stars are most likely to catch a buyer’s attention.  
Sportspersons develop their profiles over a period of time through performance on the 
pitch, philanthropic initiatives and maintaining a good image in public. The athlete 
possesses an earning capacity which is greatly enhanced by his or her fame.33 For 
instance, a player may not be famous at the time of contracting to a club, but through 
performance and determination draws admiration from the public.  
This study submits that all sportspersons have image rights that are capable of being 
commercially exploited, but it is mostly the images of the leading and famous 
sportspersons that are mainly commercialised.    
2.4. The role of sportspersons’ image rights in advertising 
Sportspersons attributes are utilised as advertising mechanisms to draw consumer’s 
attention to the product or service and make it stand out. 
Billboards, merchandise bearing the names of sportspersons, television and radio 
commercials are some of the various forms where sportspersons’ image rights are 
commercially exploited. The use of a sportsperson’s attributes in these forms of 
advertising is commonly known as sponsorship, merchandising or licensing and 
endorsements. 
 
33 Louw, A.M. 2007. Suggestions for the protection of star athletes and other famous persons against 





According to Cloete, many sportspersons earn more from their promotional activities 
than what they may earn on the sports field itself.34 This illustrates the significance of 
image rights not only for the promoters but for sportspersons as well. The promotional 
activities through which sportspersons’ image rights are exploited are detailed below.   
2.4.1. Endorsements 
Endorsement refers to an activity when someone…tells the relevant public that he 
approves of the product or service or is happy to be associated with it and adds his 
name as an encouragement to members of the relevant public to buy or use the 
service or product.35 
The essence of endorsement agreements is that the individual sportsman or sporting 
team is giving its name to, and advising the public that it accepts, the particular product 
that it is endorsing.36 An endorsement agreement generally cedes the responsibility of 
promoting a product or service to a sportsperson in exchange for payment.  
The association of brands with sportspersons is an active practice in South Africa. The 
notable endorsements deals which illustrate how images are exploited in 
endorsements includes, inter alia: Bernard Parker37 who was selected as brand 
ambassador for Clear Active,38 and, South African cricketer Kagiso Rabada who 
signed an endorsement deal with luxury watchmaker -Tag Heuer.39 Parker endorsed 
the product in a video graphic commercial while Rabada endorsed the watch brand 
through a social media (Twitter) post.  
2.4.2. Merchandising 
Merchandising involves exploiting images, themes or articles which have become 
famous.40 It commonly refers to the use of the name, logo, trademarks and other 
 
34 Cloete, R. Ed. 2005. Introduction to sports law in South Africa. Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths. p. 
176 -176.   
35 Irvine and another v Talksport Ltd [2002] 2 All ER 414. p. 418. 
36 Supra cite note 34. 
37 Bernard Parker plays for Kaizer Chiefs and is a South African International football player.  
38 Coetzee G. 2013. Clere Active strikes with Parker. Available: https://yoursport.co.za/clere-active-
strikes-with-parker/ [2019, March 06]. 
39  Sports Industry Group. 2018. Kagiso Rabada Bowled over with Tag Heuer Deal. Available: 
http://www.sportindustry.co.za/news/kagiso-rabada-bowled-over-tag-heuer-deal [2019, March 06]. 




properties relating to the sportsperson, club or organisation unconnected to the core 
business.41 
Like endorsement, merchandising consists of commercial exploitation of a 
sportsperson’s image right in an activity that is unrelated to the player’s professional 
career. Save for, when the image right is exploited by a sport club or national sport 
association in a team context in connection with the player’s professional service.   
Like all other forms of promotions, merchandising agreements are mainly conducted 
with the intention of attracting a customer’s attention to the product or brand.  
Cloete indicate that, in turn, sportspersons often earn a substantial fee or royalty that 
is paid for the privilege of allowing his name to be used for promotional purposes.42  
In merchandising, the sportspersons’ image rights are exploited as follows:  
• Football player selected as a brand ambassador and partake in the brand’s TV 
commercial.43  
• A rugby player appearing in a television commercial advertising a satellite TV 
service.44 
As stated above, sportspersons’ image rights are also exploited in merchandising by 
the clubs that they are contracted to. Sports clubs exploit sportspersons’ image rights 
through the advertising and sale of merchandise which bear the names, image and 
other attributes of the players. The merchandise may consist of replica shirts, scarfs, 
magazines, etc. The merchandise is mainly acquired by fans as a form of expressing 
their affiliation and support for the clubs.45 
2.4.3. Sponsorships 
Gardiner46 defines sponsorship as: 
 
41 Gelder, P. 2005. Image is Everything: An Analysis of the Legal Protection of the Image of Sports 
Athletes Sport image rights in Spain. The International Sports Law Journal. (1-2): 25 -35. 
42 Cloete, R. Ed. 2005. Introduction to sports law in South Africa. Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths. p 
176.  
43 SA's Khune named Kiwi African ambassador. 2010. Available: 
https://www.bizcommunity.africa/Article/410/82/53663.html [2019, March 10]. 
44 Free and proud: Openview launches a brand-new TVC. 2018. Available: 
https://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/66/184795.html  [2019, March 10]. 
45 Murray, R. Shimizu, C. O'Reilly, N. & Foster, G. 2015. Merchandise sales rank in professional sport: 
Purchase drivers and implications for National Hockey League clubs. Sport, Business and 
Management. 5(4):307-324.  




“A commercial arrangement, whereby a sponsor pays a certain sum of money (the 
sponsorship fee) and/or provides certain products, services or other facilities (value in 
kind) to the sponsored party, in return for which the sponsor can promote the image of 
the sponsor and sale of the sponsor’s products and/or services.” 
In essence, a sportsperson is paid for associating with or using a particular asset, 
apparel, brand or product and the sponsor would obtain exposure through this 
undertaking.  
One of the sponsorship deals which has been conducted in South African sport was 
between Huawei and five rugby provincial unions. The deal entailed rugby players and 
management being handed the latest gadget by the tech company.47 
The above forms of advertising using the sportspersons’ identity or fame are 
interrelated. However, it is submitted that for the purpose of this study, sponsorship 
has distinct income tax implications which falls outside the scope of this study. This 
study is therefore only concerned with the income tax treatment of receipts or accruals 
from endorsement and merchandising deals.    
2.5. Regulation of image rights in sport 
2.5.1. Law of contract 
The law of contract plays a fundamental part in sports law.48 Contracts provide a 
practical form of regulating mutual interactions in sport. The vast majority of obligations 
that occur within the context of sports are of a contractual nature.49 These include 
amongst others, transfer of players, broadcasting rights, endorsements and 
merchandising deals.  
Louw argues that in the absence of specific statutory protection or recognised 
proprietary protection for image rights under common law, image rights are currently 
mainly regulated contractually by means of specific provisions in standard player 
contracts.50  
 
47 Western Province Rugby. n.d. Huawei scores rugby’s big five. Available: http://wprugby.com/huawei-
scores-rugbys-big-five/  [2019, March 10].  
48 Cloete, R. Ed. 2005. Introduction to sports law in South Africa. Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths. p. 
17.  
49 Ibid. 





The standard clause in sports contracts typically stipulates that the player assigns the 
use and enjoyment of his image rights (identity) to the club for which he plays.51 
However, the parties may agree that the player keeps control of his image rights and 
the commercial exploitation thereof.52 The image rights regulations in the three 
sporting codes that are the subject of this study are detailed below.   
2.6. Sport governing bodies’ regulations on image rights 
2.6.1. Image rights regulations in Rugby 
The South African Rugby Employers Organisation (SAREO), Provinces (unions/clubs) 
and the South African Rugby Player’s Association (SARPA) signed the Collective 
Agreement53 which regulates the terms and conditions of contracts applicable to rugby 
players. 
Paragraph 1.13 of the Collective Agreement provides that a “contracted player” means 
a rugby player who has concluded a Player Contract with a Province. Paragraph 1 of 
the Standard Player Contract54 also refers to the relationship between a player and a 
Province.  
Paragraph 7 of the standard player contract draws the player’s attention to Part E, 
clause 29 and 30 of the Collective Agreement. The relevant clauses provide: 
“Players Collective Commercial Rights 
 It is recorded that the Players Trust and SARU [South African Rugby Union] 
have concluded an agreement under which SARU has acquired the Players’ 
Collective Commercial Rights of all Contracted Players who have transferred 
their Players’ Collective Commercial Rights to the Players Trust. It is further 
noted that in terms of such an agreement, the Players Trust has granted to 
SARU the right to use such Players Collective Commercial Rights which 
enables SARU to grant the Players Collective Commercial Rights to the 
Provinces. 
 In order to qualify for a payment in respect of an appearance, Players had to at 
least have played 1(one) Springbok test match and/or 21 (twenty) Super Rugby 
 
51 Cloete, R. 2012. The taxation of image rights: a comparative analysis. 45(3). p. 559. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Collective Agreement. 2018. Available: 
http://images.supersport.com/content/Official%20signed%20CBA%202018.pdf  [2019, March 15]. 
54 Standard Player Contract. 2016. Available: 




or Pro14 matches; and/or be part of an official Super Rugby or Pro14 squad of 
a Franchise on the date of appearance.” 
Players’ Collective Commercial Rights refers to the use of the Players Attributes in a 
team context and appearance by players in a team context (Para 1.41 of the Collective 
Agreement).  
Player Attributes refers to the rights which such a player owns and enjoys in respect 
of his attributes including, but not limited to, the right to the use of his name, nickname, 
image, likeness, signature, voice, and biographical information. 
Appearance refers to an appearance for the purpose of marketing, advertising and/or 
promoting the game of rugby, the Province, its teams and/or squads, and/or 
competitions or tournament in which the Province participates (Para 1.5 provides). 
Clause 29 of the Collective Agreement only relates to the exploitation of a player’s 
attributes in a team context. The image rights that are exploited in a team context are 
under the custodian of SARU or the Province.  
Clause 30.1 of the Collective Agreement allow players to enter into agreements or 
arrangement under which their attributes are commercially exploited in endorsing, 
promoting or marketing by third parties. On the basis that the players obtain prior 
written consent from the Province and the Province’s involvement is limited to the 
granting of consent.   
2.6.2. Image rights regulations in Cricket 
In professional cricket, the critical matters such as standard contracts, player 
remuneration, benefits, and most importantly the grant of commercial rights are 
regulated by the MOU.55 The MOU is a collective agreement signed by Cricket South 
Africa (CSA), the South African Cricketers’ Association (SACA) and Franchises 
(Clubs) which extend for a period of four years. In cricket, image rights fall under the 
concept of player’s commercial rights. 
 





SACA made proposals in respect of exploitation of player’s commercial rights in the 
1st May 2006 to 30 April 2010 MOU.56 Paragraph 13 of the executive summary of 
SACA’s proposals for the MOU57 indicate the significance of CSA obtaining the grant 
of player attributes and appearances in order to maximise revenues for sponsor 
programme and event sponsors.58 
The inclusion of player’s commercial rights in the SACA Services and Benefits 
2016/2017 Player’s Guide (Player’s Guide) could be the result of the proposals made 
for the 1st May 2006 to 30 April 2010 MOU. The Player’s Guide59 provides:  
“SACA makes a number of commercial rights payments to players who have signed 
over their commercial rights to SACA’s Players Trusts. The grant of rights agreements 
allows the player Trusts to license the Player’s Appearances, Attributes (e.g. name, 
image, voice and signature) and Content in a team context and thereby generate 
commercial revenues which are in turn paid out to players. As soon as you are 
contracted to CSA or a Franchise you become eligible for payments. Semi-professional 
contracted players may be eligible if they play Franchise matches.” 
National team player’s image rights are signed to the South African National Cricket 
Team Trust (National Trust).60 Franchise player’s image rights are signed to the South 
African Professional Cricketers' Trust (all Player Trust).61 The trusts act as 
intermediaries in licensing player’s image rights to Franchises and national team 
(CSA). The relationship between the player and club is discussed in Chapter 5. 
2.6.3. Image rights regulations in Football 
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is the highest regulating 
body in football. South African Football Association (SAFA) and Confédération 
Africaine de Football (CAF) are FIFA members.  
 
56 South African Cricketers’ Association. Executive Summary of SACA’s Proposal for the MOU. 
Available: http://webfactory.co.za/portfolio/saca/docs/saca_mou_exec_summary.pdf  [2019, March 
13]. 
57 The MOU is not available in the public domain since it is a confidential document. 
58 Supra cite note 56.  
59 South African Cricketers’ Association Services and Benefits 2016 / 2017 Player’s Guide. Available: 
http://saca.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/16.17-SACA-Services-and-Benefits-Players-Guide-
FINAL-161024.pdf    [2019, March 10]. 
60 South African Cricketers’ Association. n.d. About SACA. Available: 





The National Soccer League (NSL) which trade as the Premier Soccer League (PSL) 
has a responsibility to promote, organise, control and administer professional soccer 
in South Africa.62 NSL oversee professional football under the rules and regulations 
prescribed by SAFA. Professional football players contract with football clubs that are 
affiliated to NSL. 
NSL, SAFA and CAF do not publish standard player contracts and player’s image 
rights are not covered in their rules and regulations or constitution. Paragraphs 22.1 
of the NSL Rules suggest that when NSL, SAFA and CAF are silent on a matter, it 
shall be dealt with in accordance with the rules prescribed by FIFA.63 Consequently, 
the image rights regulation prescribed by FIFA is considered for this study.   
FIFA issued a circular64 that prescribe the minimum requirements that should be 
contained in a professional football player’s contract. The federation encourages its 
members that requirements should be regulated and agreed as a minimum by 
contracting parties, but parties have the latitude to agree on final wording. The circular 
provides that, the Club and the player have to agree on how the player’s image rights 
are exploited, if applicable.65 Moreover, as a recommendation and principle the 
individual player may exploit his right by himself (if not conflicting with clubs’ 
sponsors/partners) whilst the Club may exploit the Player’s image right as part of a 
group and/or the whole squad.66 
The overriding factors deduced from the above regulations can be summarised as 
follows:    
• By virtue of contracting with a club, the players transfer or licence the right to 
commercially exploit their images in a team or group context to a club.  
• The national team trust and all player trusts act as intermediaries in holding 
image rights of rugby and cricket players. The sport clubs and national 
 
62 Louw, A. 2012. Sports law in South Africa. 2nd ed. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 
228. 
63 National Soccer League. 2012. National Soccer League Rules. Available: 
http://images.supersport.com/NSL_Rules_as_at_1_August_2012.pdf  [2019, March 16]. 
64 Fédération Internationale de Football Association. 2008. Professional Football Player Contract 
Minimum Requirements (Circular 1171/2008). Available: 
https://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/97/29/01/circularno.1171-






associations make image rights payments to the trusts and the trusts then 
distribute payments to the players. The trusts act as custodians of image 
rights and have no authority to retain payments due to players.  
• The players can exploit their image rights in an individual capacity with third 
parties by entering into endorsement and merchandising agreements, with 
the club’s consent. This is only to the extent that the endorsement or 
merchandising agreement is not in direct competition with the club and does 
not bring the sport into disrepute.    
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter considered the image right concept in advertising and regulations 
prescribed by sport governing bodies. It is evident that there is an essential 
commercial aspect associated with the exploitation of image rights. It is therefore 
important that sportspersons, practitioners, sports clubs, revenue authority and other 
relevant stakeholders are cognisant of the income tax implications. It is also worth 
noting that the income tax consequences may vary depending on whether an image 
right is exploited by a sport club, national sport association or an enterprise.  
There is no universal factor which directs what should be stipulated in an image right 
agreement or clause. This means that what is contained in an image right agreement 
of one player may be different to that of another player. This study considers the 
regulations stipulated by the relevant sport governing bodies vis-à-vis image rights as 
a fundamental basis to examine income tax implications.   
The following chapter considers the legal recognition and protection of image rights 








Chapter 3: Classification of image rights  
3.1. Introduction   
The previous chapter, inter alia, outlined the forms under which players’ image rights 
are commercially exploited and the commercial aspect of associating a product or 
brand with a famous sportsperson. It has been established that image rights have 
immense commercial value67 and are a source of income68 for players.  
This chapter attempts to establish whether sportspersons’ image rights can be 
classified as assets. The discussion examines how the elements of image rights can 
apply to the definition of an “asset” as envisaged in the accounting and income tax 
provisions. However, the chapter commence by demonstrating how the South African 
law recognises and provides for the protection of image rights, if at all.  
3.2. Legal recognition and protection of image rights  
The South African law does not currently recognise image rights as a commercially 
exploitable and legally protectable property.69 The law does not recognise any specific 
proprietary interest and property rights in personal attributes such as image, likeness, 
voice or other aspects of persona. However, the law recognises that every person 
possesses a number of personality rights.70  
Personality rights are mainly natural rights which every man is free to enjoy.71 They 
include, inter alia, a right to life, physical integrity, bodily freedom, reputation, dignity, 
privacy, identity and feelings.72 Some of these rights have been embodied in the South 
African Constitution and they include a right to human dignity73, right to life74 and right 
 
67 Cloete, R. 2012. The taxation of image rights: A comparative analysis. p. 556. 
68 Louw, A. 2012. Sports law in South Africa. 2nd ed. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 
464. 
69 Louw, A. 2012. Sports law in South Africa. 2nd ed. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 
467.  
70 Ibid. p. 468. 
71 Rex v Umfaan (1908) TS 62 at page 66. 
72 Neethling, J. 2005. Personality rights: a comparative overview. The Comparative and International 
Law Journal of Southern Africa. 38(2). p. 215. 
73 Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Everyone has inherent dignity 
and the right to have their dignity respected and protected. 




to privacy75. For the purposes of the present study an image right falls within the ambit 
of common law right to privacy, right to identity and constitutional right to privacy.   
Since image rights are not recognised by any statute, there is no legislative provision 
which provides for the general protection and enforceability of image rights as a 
proprietary right similar to a trademark or any other intellectual property. However, 
image rights are protected against misappropriation76 in terms of common law of delict 
and constitutional right to privacy.77 The common law protection is available under the 
law of personality78 in terms of right to privacy79 and right to identity80 within the wider 
concept of dignitas.81  
 
75 Section 14 the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  Everyone has the right to privacy, 
which includes the right not to have— 
(a) their person or home searched; 
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possessions seized; or 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed. 
76 Where such use infringes the privacy of the athlete an action for breach of privacy would be available 
either under the common law or by virtue of the constitutional protection afforded to the right of privacy 
in the Bill of Rights Under the common law, an infringement of the right of privacy would occur where 
there is an unlawful intrusion on someone's personal privacy or where there is an unlawful disclosure 
of private facts about a person. The unlawfulness is judged in the light of the contemporary boni mores 
and sense of justice of the community. While the second of these examples (the disclosure of private 
facts) would normally not apply in cases of unauthorized celebrity merchandising of the name, likeness 
or other aspects of the persona, it has been held specifically that publishing a person's photograph as 
part of an advertisement without that person's consent would constitute infringement of the common-
law right to privacy; see Louw, A.M. 2007. Suggestions for the protection of star athletes and other 
famous persons against unauthorised celebrity merchandising in South African law. South African 
Mercantile Law Journal. 19(3):275-301. 
77 Louw, A. 2012. Sports law in South Africa. 2nd ed. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 
468. Section 14 the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
78 The law of personality can be defined as the legal forms aimed at protecting an individual’s 
personality, including the rules and principles which deal with the recognition, definition and protection 
of the various personality rights. See Neethling, J., Potgieter, J.M. & Visser, P.J. 2005. Neethling's law 
of personality. 2nd ed. Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths. p. 3.    
79 The right to privacy as a personality right is protected under common law of delict. See Neethling, J., 
Potgieter, J.M. & Visser, P.J. 2005. Neethling's law of personality. 2nd ed. Durban: LexisNexis 
Butterworths. p. 39. Neethling et al define ‘privacy’ as an individual condition of life characterised by 
seclusion from the public and publicity. This condition embraces all those personal facts which the 
person concerned has himself determined to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in 
respect of which he has the will that they be kept private. 
80 Identity as an interest of personality is a person’s uniqueness or individuality which identifies or 
individualises him as a particular person and thus distinguishes him from others, see Neethling, J., 
Potgieter, J.M. & Visser, P.J. 2005. Neethling's law of personality. 2nd ed. Durban: LexisNexis 
Butterworths. p. 36. 
81 In Kumalo v Cycle Lab (Pty) Ltd (2011) JOL 27372 (GSJ) it was determined that the right to identity 
is infringed by the falsification of a person's true image or identity, but infringement of identity may also, 
although not necessarily, be accompanied by an infringement of privacy. It was held that the 
unauthorised publication of the applicant’s photograph constituted infringement of personality rights.  In 
W v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (2010) 4 All SA 548 (WCC) at para 49, it was held that the appropriation of a 





3.3. Classification of image rights: Accounting 
Taxable income is ascertained in the manner prescribed by the ITA and in no other 
form.82 The accounting records can be used as a starting point of determining the 
normal tax liability and adjustments to be made in accordance with the ITA provisions.   
The accounting records are notably important in the determination of normal tax 
liability. It is thus necessary to provide an overview of how image rights shall be 
classified and recognised in terms of the accounting principles. If this is established, it 
will provide a broader perspective for income tax classification.  
The accounting treatment of image rights is discussed from the perspective of the 
image right assignees (promoters). This is done to ascertain how these parties could 
account for image rights in their financial statements upon concluding image rights 
agreements with sportspersons.  
Sport clubs prepare their financial statements in terms of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS).83 The enterprises which commercially exploit players’ 
images rights are mostly corporate entities that are also required to comply with IFRS, 
accounting principles and practice. It is for this reason that the discussion is conducted 
according to the provisions of IFRS.  
In order to limit the accounting discussion, this study assumes that a sport club, 
national sport association and an enterprise qualify as an “entity” as envisaged in 
IFRS.   
3.3.1. Asset 
The International Accounting Standards Board84 (IASB) (2018) defines an asset as “a 
present economic resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events. An 
economic resource is a right that has the potential to produce economic benefits.”  
 
intervention in order to protect the individual concerned… when the photograph is employed, […] for 
the benefit of a magazine sold to make profit, it constitutes an unjustifiable invasion of the personal 
rights of the individual, including the person’s dignity and privacy. 
82 Pyott Ltd v CIR (1945) 13 SATC 121 at page 127. 
83 PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. South African Rugby Union Consolidated Financial Statements for 
the year ended 31 December 2017. Available: 
http://images.supersport.com/content/SA_Rugby_Annual_Report_2017.pdf [2019, May 01]. 
84 International Accounting Standards Board. 2018. Conceptual framework for financial reporting: 
including IFRS practice statement 1 management commentary, IFRS practice statement 2 making 
materiality judgements, and amendments to references to the conceptual framework in IFRS standards. 
London: IFRS Foundation. p. A26. The IASB is responsible for the development, publication and 




The conclusion of image right agreements raises rights for both parties. The assignee 
acquires a right to commercially exploit a player’s image, whereas the player acquires 
a right to compensation in return for the use of an image.   
The image of a famous sportsperson has a potential to produce economic benefit 
through its use in advertisement as a mean to attract consumers to a particular product 
or service. This study has established that the use of a famous sportsperson’s attribute 
in an advertisement has the potential to increase sales. The increase in sales is the 
economic benefit that is potentially produced from the use of an image by the 
assignee.   
Control 
Image right agreements essentially effect the cession of the right to control the 
commercial exploitation of an image from a sportsperson to an assignee. The 
assignee acquires the right to use the image and can restrain other parties from using 
it in promotions by a restraint clause in the contract. The monopolistic right obtained 
by the assignee over a sportsperson’s image right exert some control as the promoter 
has the right to decide how to apply the sportsperson’s image in advertising and can 
restrain other parties from using it in similar activities.    
Past event  
The signing of an image right agreement by the respective parties is the event in which 
the control of an image right bequeaths from the player to the assignee. The right to 
use a player’s attributes in promotional activity is established at this event.     
Recognition criteria 
An asset is recognised when it is probable that the future economic benefits will flow 
to the entity and the asset has a cost or value that can be measured reliably.85  
As previously stated, the image of a famous sportsperson has an ability to produce 
economic benefits for an assignee (promoter) in the form of sales.  
The economic benefit which is likely to be derived from the use of a sportsperson’s 
image cannot be pre-determined. However, the potential return of benefit can be 
 
85 International Accounting Standards Board. 2011. A Guide through International Financial Reporting 




based on the estimate by considering factors such as the influence of the player’s 
fame, likeness and reputation. It is therefore probable that the use of a player’s image 
can bring economic benefits to the club, federation or an enterprise.  
The compensation paid by the image right assignee is the cost at which the image 
right shall be reliably measured.  
It is submitted that an image right satisfies the elements of the definition of an “asset” 
and the recognition criteria. Consequently, it is possible that an image right can be 
considered to be an asset.         
3.3.2. Intangible asset 
An image right does not have physical substance, therefore for it to be recognised as 
an asset in the financial statements it has to satisfy the requirements of an “intangible 
asset” as stipulated in International Accounting Standard (IAS) 38.  
Intangible asset86 is described as “an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical 
substance”.  
Identifiable  
Intangible asset is identifiable87 when it:  
• Is separable i.e. capable of being separated or divided from the entity and sold, 
transferred, licensed, rented, or exchanged, either individually or together with 
a related contract or, 
• Arises from contractual or other legal rights, regardless of whether those rights 
are transferable or separable from the entity or from other rights and 
obligations. 
An image right certainly satisfies the second requirement as it arises from the 




86 International Accounting Standards Board. 2018. The annotated IFRS Standards: Part A2. London: 
IFRS Foundation. Page A 1519.    




An intangible asset is recognised if it is probable that the future economic benefits that 
are attributable to the asset will flow to the entity and the cost of the asset can be 
measured reliably.88 As discussed above, it is probable that economic benefits will flow 
to the entity when images of famous sportspersons are used to advertise. Image right 
can be measured reliably at the value paid by the assignee to obtain the right to exploit 
a player’s image.    
It follows that an image right satisfies the definition and recognition criteria of an 
intangible asset. Based on this brief accounting exposition, it is submitted that image 
right can be considered an asset and an intangible asset, respectively. However, each 
transaction has to be evaluated on its own facts and merits. It is therefore possible 
that in some instances the requirements may not be satisfied.  
Other aspects of an asset and intangible asset such as the useful life of an image right, 
amortisation and de-recognition fall outside the scope of the above elementary 
exposition.   
3.4. Classification of image right: Income tax 
Stiglingh et al89 indicates that as a general rule, the principal Act (ITA) takes 
precedence over the Eighth Schedule of the ITA. A reference is made to the Eighth 
Schedule in this section solely for the purpose of determining whether an image right 
can be classified as an asset for income tax purposes. The following discussion does 
not override the general income tax rules.90   
Para 1 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA provides that an “asset” includes: 
(a) property of whatever nature, whether movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, 
excluding any currency, but including any coin made mainly from gold or platinum; and 
(b) a right or interest of whatever nature to or in such property. 
 
88 Ibid at page A1523.   
89 Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Heerden, L., Wilcocks, J.S., de Swardt, R.D., van der Zwan, P. 
2017. SILKE: South African Income Tax. 20th ed. Durban: LexisNexis. p. 535. 
90 If an asset falls to be dealt with under the Eighth Schedule and the general income tax provisions, 
the legislation provides for adjustments when an asset is disposed. For example, wear and tear 
allowances on a capital asset are deducted from the base cost of the asset for capital gains tax 
purposes. The same applies to trading stock (a revenue asset) which will be dealt with in terms of 
section 22 of the ITA and therefore has to be taken into account in calculating any capital gain: revenue 
income deducted from proceeds and opening stock deducted from base cost would render a nil capital 




It is clear from the above that for something to be considered an asset it has to be 
property or a right to or in such property. The classification of an image right is 
evaluated in terms of this framework.  
Image right is essentially the exclusive right that a sportsperson has over the 
commercial exploitation of personal identity. An image right agreement provides for 
the transfer, grant, licencing or assignment of the right to a club, or an enterprise, not 
the corporeal or incorporeal image per se.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the term “image” is used in the present study to refer to 
physical and non-physical attributes of a sportsperson. Therefore, it is not necessary 
to determine whether image is a moveable, immovable, corporeal, or an incorporeal 
asset as the discussion is concerned with the classification of the right to such image 
and not with the image itself. 
The word “property” is not defined in the ITA. In the Estate Duty Act, property is defined 
as “any right in or to property, movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal.”91  
In CIR v Estate CP Crewe & Another92, Watermeyer CJ remarked as follows:   
“[P]roperty is all rights vested in him which have a pecuniary or economic value. Such 
rights can conveniently be referred to as proprietary rights and they include jura in rem, 
real rights such as rights of ownership in both immovable and movable property, and 
also jura in personam such as debts and rights of action.” 
Image is vested in a sportsperson as an aspect of personality property93 which 
inherently come into existence at the beginning of legal personality94. In view of the 
definition of property formulated by Watermeyer CJ, in Estate CP Crewe case supra, 
an image right would be regarded as property if it has a pecuniary or economic value 
and is a real or personal right. 
 
91 Section 3(2) of the Estate Duty Act No.45 of 1955. 
92 (1943) 2 SATC 344 at 352. 
93 Heaton, J. 2012.The South African Law of Persons. 4th ed. Durban: LexisNexis. p. 4. 




3.4.1. Pecuniary or economic value 
Economic value is the value of an asset calculated according to its ability to produce 
income in the future.95 It represents the maximum amount that the user is willing to 
pay for the asset.96 
It follows that the economic value of a famous sportsperson’s image is its ability to 
generate sales through its potential to encourage purchase and consumption of the 
product or service.97 The economic benefits are the sales which are directly 
attributable to the use of a sportsperson’s image to promote a product or service.  
Image right acquires real value when a player has developed a public profile and the 
image can be applied in attention economy.98 It has been established that a 
sportsperson’s image has the potential to derive revenue for the club or the promoter.99   
The amount that the assignee is willing to pay for the image right is generally a subject 
of contractual negotiations between the parties. The amount or value for the image 
right is determined by considering factors such as the exclusive and non-exclusive use 
of the right, personality risk, contract renewal, reputational risk and marketing 
longevity.100  
3.4.2. Real and personal right 
A real right (jus in rem) is a right in a thing, which is enforceable against all persons, 
or against the whole world.101 The rights emanating from an image right agreement 
are only enforceable by the contracting parties. It follows that image right does not 
give rise to real rights.  
A personal right (jus in personam) is a right in or against a particular person or group 
of persons.102 The contracting parties to the image right agreement have rights against 
 
95 The Cambridge Dictionary [online]. Available: 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/economic-value  [2019, May 05]. 
96 Investopedia. Available: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economic-value.asp  [2019, April 14]. 
97 Coors, C. 2015. Are sports image rights assets? A legal, economic and tax perspective. The 
International Sports Law Journal. 15(1):64-68. 
98 In this study, attention economy is the ability or capacity of a sportsperson’s image to attract 
attention. 
99 Refer to the discussion at para 3.4.  
100 King, K. n.d.  Image Rights: Valuable Intellectual Property. Available: 
http://www.valuationconsulting.com/documents/content/files/Image%20Rights_web.pdf [2019, April 
26]. 
101 South African Revenue Service. 2018. Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax (Issue 7). p. 46 




each other. A sportsperson has a right to claim delivery of compensation and the 
promoter has a right to claim performance or an act. 
The court accepted in ITC 1735103 that an attribute of a sportsperson is considered as 
an asset for income tax purposes. Image right is a sportsperson’s personal right 
attached by means of legal personality. It is apparent that an image right satisfies the 
requirements of an asset and could be classified as such. 
3.5. Conclusion  
It is evident that the South African law does not currently recognise image rights as 
some form of property. Notwithstanding this, the law protects image rights against 
unauthorised use in promotional activities.   
It has been established that in terms of the accounting provisions an image right could 
be classified as an asset and intangible asset, respectively. Similarly, an image right 
could be regarded as an asset for income tax purposes. However, each case has to 
be evaluated on its own objective facts and merits. The classification of an image right 
for income tax purposes is discussed further in Chapter 4 in the process of determining 
the nature of receipts or accruals generated in favour of sportspersons from the 














Chapter 4: Analysis of the legislation and case law 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter seeks to investigate whether the income earned by sportspersons from 
the commercial exploitation of their image rights shall be included in gross income or 
it is income of a capital nature. This examination is conducted through the analysis of 
the relevant legislation and case law which relate to the classification of income. In 
light of the conclusion reached in Chapter 3 about the classification of an image right 
as an asset, this chapter elaborate on this aspect in the test to determine the nature 
of income. Since there is no specific legal tax framework that regulates the taxing of 
income from exploitation of image rights, a sportsperson can seek to discharge the 
onus of proving that income shall be taxed at a lower rate.104 The potential arguments 
which may be raised by sportspersons will also be considered.       
4.2. Gross income  
Section 5 of the ITA provides that income tax is levied on the taxable income received 
by or accrued to a person. The starting point for determining a person’s taxable income 
is to establish whether a receipt or accrual is gross income or not. The definition of 
gross income lays a foundation of the income tax system.  
Gross income is defined in section 1 of the ITA as follows:  
“in relation to any year or period of assessment, means -  
(i) in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by 
or accrued to or in favour of such resident;…  
during such year or period of assessment, excluding receipts or accruals of a capital 
nature…” 
The definition also extends to specifically include receipts or accruals regardless of 
whether they are of a capital nature or not in terms of paragraph (a) to (n).   
In order for a receipt or an accrual to be included in gross income and subject to 
income tax, the following components must be present:  
• the total amount, in cash or otherwise, 
 
104 When the income generated from the commercial exploitation of an image right is found to be of a 
capital nature it will be subjected to capital gains tax and only a fraction will be included in taxable 
income in terms of section 26A of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962. In contrast, when the income is 




• received by or accrued to or in favour of, 
• during such year or period of assessment, and 
• excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature. 
The above components of gross income are not defined in the ITA, save for the “year 
of assessment”. The courts have been called upon to interpret the meaning of the 
undefined components. The principles and guidelines laid down by the courts are 
applied to determine the nature of income earned by sportspersons from the 
commercial exploitation of their image rights.   
4.3. The total amount, in cash or otherwise  
A receipt or accrual is included in gross income if it is an amount in cash or otherwise. 
The term "amount" is given a wider meaning which does not only include money, but 
the value of every form of property105 earned by the taxpayer, whether corporeal or 
incorporeal, which has a money value.106  
In CIR v Delfos107 and Stander v CIR108, the Provincial court divisions respectively 
concluded that tax is assessed on receipts or accruals that have monetary value and 
that if something is not money’s worth or cannot be turned into money, it is not to be 
regarded as income. The findings made by the courts in the foregoing cases are 
contrary to the earlier decision of WH Lategan v CIR109.  
In the context of the present study, the findings of the Delfos and Stander cases supra 
appear to suggest that if a sportsperson is compensated for the use of an image right 
in any form other than money, the value of property received is not considered to be 
an amount and shall not be included in gross income. It is submitted that if these 
findings were to be accepted in the present study, this will result to an anomaly as it 
not a requirement that the compensation for exploitation of image rights should only 
be in a form of money. Therefore, sportspersons may be compensated in money or in 
any other form of property.   
 
105 See para 3.4 for the discussion of property.  
106 WH Lategan v CIR (1926) 2 SATC 16 at page 19 – 20. 
107 (1933) 6 SATC 92 at page 99. 
108 Stander v CIR (1997) 59 SATC 212. Per Friedman JP: “Having gone on the trip he had not received 
any ‘property’ on which a monetary value could be placed in his hands. He was no more able to turn it 
into money or money’s worth after accepting the award, than he was at the time when the donation was 
still at the executory stage." 




However, the decisions of Delfos and Stander were rejected by the court in the case 
of CSARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd and Others110. In this case, the 
respondent carried on business as a developer of retirement villages. The respondent 
obtained interest-free loans from the potential occupants. The loans were then utilised 
to finance the construction of units in the retirement village.  
Interest-free loans granted to the respondent by the potential occupants were 
considered to be a quid pro quo for the life-right to occupy the residential units. 
However, the Commissioner assessed the respondent and included the value 
representing the amount equal to the right to use interest-free loans in gross income. 
The court held that “the question whether a receipt or accrual in a form other than 
money has a money value is the primary question and the question whether such 
receipt or accrual can be turned into money is but one of the ways in which it can be 
determined whether or not this is the case; in other words, it does not follow that if a 
receipt or accrual cannot be turned into money, it has no money value. The test is 
objective, not subjective...The question cannot be whether an individual taxpayer is in 
a position to turn a receipt or accrual into money. If that were the law, the right to live 
in a house rent-free, or to drive a motor vehicle without paying for it, for example, could 
be rendered tax-free by the simple expedient of limiting the right to exercise such 
benefit to the recipient – which manifestly is not the case.”111 
It is apparent from this case that a receipt or accrual does not need to be money or 
capable of being turned into money for it be classified as an amount. However, the 
court did not provide a guideline for valuing the right to an interest-free loan. This 
omission has been criticised by Emslie et al112. The authors consider that in the 
absence of any quantified amount having been shown to have been received by or 
accrued by virtue of the use of an interest-free loan, there is indeed no ‘amount’ 
accruing to a taxpayer. This study does not extend into the valuation of interest free 
loans.  
It is submitted that in cases whereby sportspersons are compensated for the right to 
use their images in advertising by property or in any other form other than cash, the 
 
110 (2007) 69 SATC 205. 
111 Ibid at page 214. 
112 Emslie, T & Davis, D. 2011. Cumulative Supplement to Income Tax Cases & Materials. 3rd ed. Cape 




amount can be ascertained113 by determining the value that could be obtained for that 
particular property if it was to be sold under a reasonable method in an open market 
at the date when the recipient becomes entitles to the property.114 For example, a 
sportsperson may be awarded a motor vehicle when he or she is appointed as a brand 
ambassador of a motor vehicle brand. The amount to be considered as the income of 
a sportsperson is the open market value of the motor vehicle.  
The regulations prescribed by the sport bodies do not explicitly provide that players 
should only be compensated in money. As such, the parties can reach an agreement 
that a player is compensated for exploitation of image rights in any form other than 
money. By way of example, in a merchandising initiative, a player could be granted a 
club’s merchandise for free, the value of the merchandise granted is the ‘amount’ as 
envisaged in the definition of gross income.    
It follows that any form of property or money received by or accrued to a sportsperson 
from exploitation of an image constitutes an amount which shall be included in gross 
income if all the requirements have been satisfied.  
4.4. Received by or accrued to or in favour of 
An accrual is likely to precede receipt, or the events may coincide. An amount is 
included in the gross income at the earlier of receipt or accrual, not both when it 
accrues and when it is received.115 The Commissioner does not have a right to elect 
in which year the amount shall be included in gross income.116 
• Received by 
In Geldenhuys v CIR117, the appellant was a usufructuary of an estate which included 
a flock of sheep. The children held the bare dominium of the sheep. The appellant 
decided to sell the sheep after obtaining the children's consent. The court had to 
decide whether the proceeds from sale of sheep were received in favour of the 
usufructuary or the children (heirs). The court held that the words ‘received by’ must 
mean received by the taxpayer on his or her own behalf for own benefit. It was found 
 
113 CIR v Butcher Bros (Pty) Ltd (1945) 13 SATC 21 at page 38. 
114 Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR (1938) 9 SATC 349 at page 362. 
115 CIR v Delfos (1933) 6 SATC 92 at page 113. 
116 SIR v Silverglen Investments (Pty) Ltd (1947) 30 SATC 199 at page 207. 




that the proceeds were not received by the appellant for own benefit but for the benefit 
of the heirs as they had a bare dominium in the flock of sheep. 
As previously discussed, the image rights of rugby and cricket players that are 
exploited in a team or group context are administered by the respective player 
trusts.118 The player trusts are responsible for receiving payments from the clubs on 
behalf of the players and pay over the amounts to the qualifying players.119  
The arrangement between the player trusts and the players should be substantially 
constructed in such a form that the player trusts assume the functionality of an agent 
as opposed to a principal.  
It became apparent in CIR v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs (1960) 23 
SATC 380, that the functions of a party to an arrangement shall be clearly articulated 
and executed. In this case, the taxpayer organised and held a horse racing event to 
raise funds for the benefit of two charities. The taxpayer accordingly derived proceeds 
from the horse race event and paid the proceeds over to the respective charities. 
However, the Commissioner included the proceeds in the gross income of the 
taxpayer. The court had to determine whether the proceeds were received for the 
benefit of the taxpayer considering that the taxpayer had fulfilled the obligation of 
paying the proceeds over to the charity organisations. The court held that the taxpayer 
was entitled to the proceeds and that the moral obligation to pay proceeds to the 
charities did not discharge the taxpayer from the beneficial character of the receipt. 
The court’s decision emphasises that the functions of the intermediaries, which would 
be the player trusts in the present study, should be clearly articulated and executed in 
a form that a trust does not attain beneficial ownership of the amount.   
It is submitted that based on the regulations relating to the image rights of rugby and 
cricket players exploited in a team or group context, the amount received by the player 
trusts is not received for their own benefit. The amount shall be considered in the 
assessment of the players and not that of the player trusts provided that the 
agreements are structured as aforementioned.  
• Accrued to 
 
118 Refer to discussion at para 2.6.1 and 2.6.2. 




In WH Lategan v CIR120, it was held that an amount accrues when a taxpayer becomes 
entitled to the right to claim the amount. It was established in CIR v Peoples Store 
(Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd121 case that no more is required for an accrual other than that 
a taxpayer becomes entitled to an amount.  
The concept of entitlement was given a wider meaning in Mooi v SIR (1972) 34 SATC 
1. In this case, the appellant was granted an option to acquire shares in a company. 
The option was only exercisable six months after the construction of the mine and 
provided that the appellant was still in the company’s employ. The construction of the 
mine was completed on 01 March 1966 and the option became exercisable on 01 
September 1966.  
However, the taxpayer decided to exercise the option a month after (01 October 1966) 
it became exercisable. The Commissioner assessed the taxpayer at the difference of 
the market value of shares at the date when the option became exercisable (01 
September 1966) and the option price at the date when the option was accepted. It 
was argued on behalf of the appellant that accrual took place at the date when the 
option was accepted, and the assessment should have been calculated at the value 
when the option was accepted (17 July 1973). It was held that the right to exercise the 
option accrued to the appellant at the time when the conditions attached were fulfilled.  
In the context of the present study, the time of accrual is when the parties satisfy the 
terms and conditions pertaining to an image right agreement. The amount will be 
assessed when a sportsperson becomes unconditionally entitled to an amount based 
on the particular facts of each agreement.  
4.5. During such year or period of assessment 
Section 1 of the ITA provides that the ‘year of assessment’ means any year or other 
period in respect of which any tax or duty leviable under this Act is chargeable, and 
any reference in this Act to any year of assessment ending the last day of February. 
With regard to image right payments, the amount shall be considered in the 
assessment of a sportsperson if it so received or accrued during the year of 
assessment ending on the last day of February. In the case where the payment is 
 
120 (1926) 2 SATC 16 at page 20. 




received by a trust on behalf of a sportsperson in one year, but only paid to the 
sportsperson in a later year it accrues to the sportsperson in year one.122    
4.6. Excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature  
The income earned by the sportsperson from the commercial exploitation of image 
rights can either be considered to be income of a revenue or capital nature. It is not 
possible to have income, which is neither revenue nor capital. In delivering the 
judgment of the Appellate Division in Pyott Ltd v CIR123, Davis AJA stated as follows:    
“I do not understand how this £9,000 could be … ‘non-capital’, and yet ‘not income’. 
This is a half-way house of which I have no knowledge.” 
The ITA contains no definition of “receipts or accruals of a capital nature". The tests 
and guidelines laid down by the courts have to be studied to obtain the meaning of the 
phrase.    
The courts have deliberated extensively on the issue of classification of the income 
between revenue and capital nature. However, there is still no single infallible test124 
which has been formulated to settle the matter. Notwithstanding the plethora of tests 
and guidelines laid down by the courts, sound commercial and good sense remains 
the most useful tool125 to determine the nature of income. 
Stiglingh et al submit that “the enquiry as to whether an amount is of an income or a 
capital nature is a question of fact, which has to be decided on the merits of each case. 
Although the court will consider the guidelines which have been laid down in earlier 
decisions, it will have regard to the totality of the relevant facts and circumstances of 
each case.”126 
It follows that the classification of income emanating from the commercial exploitation 
of image right shall be determined on the objective factors such as the regulations 
prescribed by the sport bodies and the forms in which the player’s image rights are 
commercially exploited. 
 
122 Refer to discussion at para 4.4.  
123 (1944) 13 SATC 121 at page 126. 
124 CIR v Pick ’N Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust (1992) 54 SATC 271(A) at page 279.  
125 ITC 1450 (1988) 51 SATC 70(N) at page 76. 
126 Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Heerden, L., Wilcocks, J.S., de Swardt, R.D., van der Zwan, P. 




4.6.1. Nature of the asset 
As previously concluded, image right is classifiable as an asset for income tax 
purposes. Similar to other rights, the transfer, grant and assignment or licencing of 
image rights has income tax consequences. The amount received by or accruing to a 
sportsperson will be included in gross income if it is of a revenue nature. Whereas, if 
it is of a capital nature it will be subject to capital gains tax in terms of the Eighth 
Schedule to the ITA and a fraction included in taxable income in terms of section 26A 
of the ITA.  
In CIR v Visser127 Judge Maritz stated the following: 
“If we take the economic meaning of ‘capital’ and ‘income’, the one excludes the other. 
‘Income’ is what ‘capital’ produces, or is something in the nature of interest or fruit as 
opposed to principal or tree. This economical distinction is a useful guide in matters of 
income tax, but its application is very often a matter of great difficulty, for what is 
principal or tree in the hands of one man may be interest or fruit in the hands of 
another.” 
The relationship between income128 and capital is metaphorical akin to the fruit and 
tree analogy. However, this analogy can be competently applied in the present study 
once it has been established whether an image right is or not considered to be a capital 
asset for income tax purposes. This will enable a broader perspective for the 
classification of income.  
The term “capital” is not defined in the ITA. Therefore, the meaning of the word is 
sought from the judicial decisions. 
In SIR v Watermeyer129, it was held that “capital” need not necessarily consist of 
money: a working man’s sole capital may be his capacity to work, and his earnings 
are his income.” It is evident that capital is not only money or something with a physical 
substance. For example, a sportsperson’s ability to perform and exercise his or her 
profession at the highest level is capital if it brings real value. 
 
127 (1937) TPD 77 at page 81.  
128 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962: “Income” is the amount remaining of the gross 
income of any person for any year or period of assessment after deducting therefrom any amounts 
exempt from normal tax. 




It was confirmed in Smith v SIR130 that personal attributes and abilities are 
recognisable as capital assets. Steyn CJ stated as follows:   
“It is not an uncommon thing to describe personal attributes, faculties or qualifications 
conferring or enhancing the capacity to earn income, as capital asset… the word 
“capital” has to be given its ordinary meaning. Broadly speaking and for present 
purposes, it may be said to connote money and every form of property used or capable 
of being used in the production of income or wealth. Such a commercial or business 
sense is the sense in which one expects it to be used in the context here in question, 
and it is to capital in that sense that, for the purposes of sec. 11 (2) (b) bis at any rate, 
expenditure is to be related in order to determine whether or not it is expenditure of a 
capital nature.”131 
It is evident from the above two cases that something does not need to have a physical 
substance to constitute a capital asset for income tax purposes. 
An image is an inherent aspect of a sportsperson’s personality property132 attained at 
the beginning of legal personality.133 This personality property is legally protected in 
terms of the common law of personality rights and constitutional right to privacy.134   
Image right is essentially a sportsperson’s exclusive right to control and decide by 
whom and when personal attributes can be commercially exploited. This exclusive 
legal right can be transferred, granted, assigned or licenced to a club, association or 
an enterprise through conclusion of an image right agreement.   
In Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd v CSARS135 case, the taxpayer (South African 
subsidiary) obtained exclusive right to distribute alcohol in South Africa and other 
territories from its UK based parent company. The appellant and parent company 
agreed to an early termination of the distribution agreement. As a result, the appellant 
was paid an early termination fee. The Commissioner assessed the appellant and 
included the termination fee in gross income.  
The taxpayer objected and appealed against the Commissioner’s assessment. The 
appellant contended that the distribution right is a capital asset and that the termination 
 
130 (1968) (2) SA 480.  
131 Ibid at page 102. 
132 Heaton, J. 2012.The South African Law of Persons. 4th ed. Durban: LexisNexis. p. 4 
133 Ibid. p.12. 
134 Refer to discussion at para 3.2.  




fee was of a capital nature. The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) upheld the appellant’s 
contention and affirmed the court a quo’s finding that an exclusive right to control the 
distribution of products is a capital asset.  
It is submitted that the exclusive control held by a sportsperson over the commercial 
use of personal identity is a capital asset for income tax purpose based on its ability 
to add value when it is employed in advertising and produce income for a 
sportsperson.  
4.6.2. Income tax transaction 
The process of image right exploitation together with the regulations was discussed in 
Chapter 2. The relevant provisions can be summarised as follows:  
• The SARU acquires the collective commercial rights of all contracted players 
who have transferred their commercial rights to the Players Trust.136  
• The SACA makes commercial rights payments to players who have signed over 
their commercial rights to SACA Player Trusts. The Player Trusts licence 
commercial rights to the respective clubs to be exploited in a team or group 
context.137  
• The football players may exploit image rights in an individual capacity whilst a 
club may exploit a player’s image right in a team context.138  
The fundamental terms used in the regulations to conduct the exploitation of image 
right are “transfer”, “grant”, “assignment” and “licence”. The meaning of these terms is 
pivotal to the income tax implications but the doctrine of substance over form 
prevails.139 Significant value is placed on the real substance of the transaction, not the 
form (words applied) of the transaction. 
4.6.3.  Substance over form    
The substance of the image rights agreements can be examined through 
determination of whether a transfer, grant, assignment or licencing of an image right 
constitute a sale. The common law provides that a sale transaction must satisfy the 
requirements of the transfer of ownership.  
 
136 Refer to para. 2.6.1. 
137 Refer to para. 2.6.2. 
138 Refer to para. 2.6.3. 




Ownership is a bundle of "incidents of ownership" which includes inter alia, the right 
to possess, use and manage the income and the capital including the right to alienate, 
liberate, waste, consume and destroy the asset.140   
In Zandberg v van Zyl141, Solomon JA stated that:  
“[T]he object which a purchaser of anything has in view is to acquire the dominium in 
that thing… seeing that Mrs. Van Zyl had no means except the wagon, and that she 
was indebted to Mrs. Zandberg in the sum of £100 so that the return of the document 
was really a matter of small moment; and the same may be said of the endorsement 
upon it. On the whole, though, I must confess that I feel some difficulty, I find it easier 
to hold that these were mere matters of form than to come to the alternative conclusion 
that there was a genuine sale, coupled with conditions of such a nature as to deprive 
the purchaser of practically all the benefits of ownership, and under circumstances of 
so suspicious a nature as those that were present in this case.” 
A dominium is an essential element in a contract of sale. If dominium does not change 
hands, an agreement cannot be classified as that of a sale.  
It is submitted that the substance of the image rights regulations and standard player 
contracts outlined in Chapter 2 do not provide for a change of ownership of an image 
right from a sportsperson to a promoter.  
An image right agreement does not deprive the sportsperson of nearly all benefits to 
possess and use the image right and manage the income emanating from the 
exploitation thereof. Furthermore, a club or an enterprise does not assume the 
ownership and risks associated with the player’s image right. For example, in a case 
whereby another party without consent uses a player’s image, the player has the duty 
to seek legal remedy and protection, not the club, association or enterprise which 
exploit a player’s image right. The club, association or enterprise does not assume risk 
of this nature.142   
Furthermore, in Kumalo143 case supra the court held that: 
 
140 Sibanda & Zantwijk Patent Attorneys. 2007. IP assignments ‐ is mere signature and recordal of 
assignment required? Available: https://snz.co.za/articles/structured-finance/ip-assignments-is-mere-
signature-and-recordal-of-assignment-required/ [2019, May 22].  
141 (1910) AD 302 at page 318 – 319. 
142 Refer to the discussion at para 2.6. 




“Personality rights are inseparably bound up with one's personality. They do not exist 
independently of the human personality and are incapable of being transferred. There 
is a fundamental distinction between personality rights and intellectual or immaterial 
property rights which are capable of being transferred and have a separate legal 
existence.” 
It follows that regardless of concluding an agreement to transfer an image right to a 
promoter, a sportsperson retains nearly all the rights associated with inherent 
personality rights. An image right agreement typically provides for the transfer of the 
right to use image in advertising for a specific period, not for the transfer of image 
itself.   
The change of ownership was also considered by the SCA in BP Southern Africa (Pty) 
Ltd v CSARS (2007) JOL 19430 (SCA). In this case, the court had to inter alia, 
determine whether the appellant (BP SA) acquired ownership of the licenced marks 
and licenced marketing indicia in exchange for royalty fees paid to its UK based parent 
company (BP UK). The Commissioner disallowed the royalty fees claimed by the 
appellant on the premise that the expenditure was of a capital nature. In deciding on 
the nature of the expenditure, the court examined the true nature of the agreement 
which provided that the parent company remained the rightful owner of the licensed 
marks and licensed marketing indicia and that upon termination of the agreement, BP 
SA would no longer be entitled to use the marks and indicia.  
The court held that the annual royalty fees paid by the appellant were in consideration 
for the use of the licensed marks and the licensed marketing indicia. The purpose of 
the royalty payments was to procure the right to use, not to acquire ownership of 
intellectual property from the sole and rightful owner. Ownership of intellectual property 
remained with BP UK throughout the period of the agreement. Upon termination of the 
agreement, BP SA would automatically cease to have the right to use intellectual 
property. The court's ratio decidendi was that the expenditure neither created nor 
preserved any capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer (BP SA).   
It is clear from the above that an image right agreement does not constitute a contract 
of sale since a sportsperson does not relinquish ownership. Therefore, the test to be 




remains the sole and rightful holder of an image right since it is an inseparable 
personal right.   
4.6.4. The test applied to image rights  
The question of whether income is of a revenue or capital nature does not only arise 
when there is a disposal of an asset. This study has established that, an image right 
is an inherent personality right which cannot be disposed by a sportsperson. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the intention144 of a sportsperson with regard 
to the transfer, assignment, grant or licensing of an image right.  
In COT v Booysen’s Estates, Ltd.145 Judge Wessels remarked as follows: 
“It is true that there is no definite test that can always be applied in order to determine 
whether a gain or profit is income or not, but it may safely be asserted that the revenue 
or profit which is derived from a thing without its changing owners is rather to be 
considered as income than as capital. On the other hand, the profit which is derived 
from a thing when it changes owners is rather of the nature of capital than of income.” 
Innes CJ affirmed in Booysen’s supra that “income considered in relation to capital is 
revenue derived from capital productively employed… we have to enquire whether 
profit has resulted from the productive use of capital employed to earn it, or whether it 
has resulted from the realisation of capital at an enhanced value. In the former case it 
falls within the definition of income… in the latter it remains capital.”146  
The test formulated in Booysen’s case supra was affirmed in the Lace Proprietary 
Mines Ltd v CIR147 case. Stratford CJ accepted that a profit emanating from the 
productive use of capital is not an accrual of a capital nature.   
The enquiry on the substance of image rights regulations and the classification of an 
image right as a personal right reveal that image rights agreements typically provides 
for a licensing of a right to use a sportsperson’s image in advertising for a specific 
period of time, not for the disposal of the right. It follows that the income is generated 
from the productive employment of image rights rather than disposal at an enhanced 
value.  
 
144 Elandsheuwel Farming (Pty) Ltd v SIB (1978) 39 SATC 163 at para 182. 
145 (1918) 32 SATC 10 at page 15 – 16. 
146 Ibid at page 25. 




In applying the principles from the Booysen’s Estates and Lace Proprietary Mines 
cases supra, it is submitted that the income received by or accrued to or in favour of 
sportspersons from the commercial exploitation of image rights is of a revenue nature. 
By application of the fruit and tree analogy from the Visser case supra, an image right 
can be likened to a tree and income to a fruit.  
It is therefore submitted that the amount derived from the commercial exploitation of 
image rights satisfy the requirements of the gross income definition. The amount 
should be included in the sportspersons’ taxable income in terms of section 1 of the 
ITA definition of “gross income”.  
4.7. Case law on the transfer of similar incorporeal assets 
In ITC 1738 (2000) 65 SATC 37, the court had to consider whether ‘initial franchise 
fees’ received by the taxpayer were of a revenue or capital nature. The appellant 
granted the right to exploit its identifications and know-hows to various dealers. The 
Commissioner assessed the taxpayer and included the initial franchise fees in gross 
income.  
The appellant contended that initial franchise fees were of a capital nature on the basis 
that identifications and know-how are capital assets and the transfer of the right to use 
sterilised such assets. The court held that "the capital assets at all times vested in 
appellant. Appellant received payments from the franchisees for the right to make 
temporary use thereof... the assets in question were productively used by appellant to 
earn income. It did not part with the assets as such. The receipts in question are 
accordingly of a revenue nature".148 
Inasmuch this case considered the transfer of recognised intellectual property, the 
court’s ratio decidendi was to the effect that the appellant did not dispose of the 
intellectual properties but merely assigned the right to use. It is submitted that a similar 
approach should apply to the classification of image right payments.   
In ITC 1735 (2002) 64 SATC 455, a UK based golfer participated in a golf tournament 
held in South Africa. The golfer entered into an agreement with the tournament 
promoters. In terms of the agreement, the golfer was required to transfer the right to 
exploit his name, likeness, biographical material, conduct interviews and participate in 
 




pre-tournament promotional events in exchange for a fee. The Commissioner 
assessed the taxpayer and included the fee in gross income. 
The taxpayer contended that the fee was of a capital nature as it was received in 
exchange for the use of his name, likeness and biographical material and was not 
intended and worked for, but purely fortuitous and a by-product of participating in the 
tournament. In the alternative, the taxpayer contended that the payment was for a 
restraint of trade as he contractually undertook to exclusively participate in the 
tournament. The court held that the fee was income that a professional golfer would 
expect to earn for participating in a golf tournament which traded on the reputation of 
the participants and cannot be considered of a capital nature. The court indicated that 
the golfer allowed his name and reputation to be used to publicise the golf tournament 
and it cannot be said that it was purely fortuitous. It was held further that by allowing 
his name and reputation to be used, the golfer did not dispose of such assets. The 
golfer continued to possess them post the tournament and the receipt of the fee. 
Consequently, the fee was found to be of a revenue nature. It is apparent that a 
sportsperson does not discharge the ownership of image right by merely allowing it to 
be commercially exploited in promotional activities. The income is a product of a 
capital asset productively employed. 
4.8. Burden of proof 
Notwithstanding the finding that income is of a revenue nature, a sportsperson may 
attempt to discharge the onus of proving that the income should not be included in 
gross income.149 A sportsperson may, inter alia, posit that a capital asset is renounced 
during the effective period of the image right contract. It may be also be argued that 
the payment is received or accrued for the sterilisation of a capital asset, therefore it 
is a restraint of trade payment.  
The first point of contention could only succeed when it can be discharged that a 
sportsperson relinquishes image right ownership in favour of an assignee. In the light 
of previous discussion which concludes that an image right is an inherent personality 
right which cannot be disposed by a sportsperson; it is unlikely that the first contention 
would be accepted by the Commissioner or by the courts.150 
 
149 Section 102 of the Tax Administration Act No. 28 of 2011. 




The possible contention that an amount constitutes a restraint of trade has to be 
evaluated on the objective facts pertaining to image rights. The facts available to this 
study are the regulations prescribed by the sport governing bodies, standard player 
contracts and MOUs.    
The ITA does not provide a meaning for the term “restraint of trade”. The courts have 
laid down principles and guidelines which aid to identify agreements that constitutes 
restraint of trade. 
In Taeuber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1975) 37 SATC 129, the appellant carried on 
business as an agent and a distributor of certain products belonging to a German 
company (BASF). The appellant acted as the latter’s sole agent and representative in 
South Africa. Upon expiry of the agreement, the supplier invoked a clause which 
provided that the appellant shall not sell or assist in the sale of any products which 
competes with that of BASF for a period of two years. The appellant was then 
compensated by the supplier for the invocation of this clause. The Secretary assessed 
the appellant and included the compensation in gross income. The appellant filed an 
appeal to the Appellant Division after the disallowance of the objection.   
The court found that the compensation was of a capital nature and held that “what the 
parties intended… was a payment of a sum of money to restrain the appellant, for a 
period of two years, from earning income by the sale of all products competing with 
those of BASF… part of appellant’s income-producing structure which had sold only 
BASF products was not only permanently prevented from selling BASF products by 
the termination of the agreement, but also effectively closed for two years to the extent 
that it was prevented, for that period, from selling all such products as would compete 
with the BASF products, and the amount payable in terms of clause X(2) was intended 
to be, and must be construed as, compensation for this closure.”151 
A restraint of trade was considered at the instance of an individual in ITC 1338 (1980) 
43 SATC 171(T). In this case, the company was concerned about the poaching of its 
senior executives. Consequently, it entered into an agreement with an executive. The 
agreement provided that for a period of two years post termination of employment with 
the company, the executive would be restricted from rendering services to any person 
 




(entity) which competes with the company. It was held that a person’s right to trade 
freely is an incorporeal asset and if he is paid for a restriction upon that right, whether 
partial or complete, he is being paid compensation for the loss or sterilization of the 
asset.  
The element of restraint deduced from the rules and regulations outlined in Chapter 2 
provide to the extent that a player shall not use an image to promote a competing club 
or use it in manner that brings the sport into disrepute.152 This provision can only be 
regarded as a restraint of trade if it is reasonable, enforceable and not contrary to the 
public policy,153 protect legal recognisable proprietary interest and not merely seek to 
exclude or eliminate competition.154  
A restraint cause or provision would be considered to be a restraint of trade if it protects 
the proprietary interest of the image right assignee155 and to the extent that such 
property includes goodwill, confidential trade secrets and know how.156 
It is submitted that a sport club, national sport association, or an enterprise (assignee) 
that exploits a sportsperson’s image rights do not have any proprietary interest in the 
image of a sportsperson.  
The element of restraint in the image rights agreements regulations do not extend 
further than the common law duty not to compete or to cause harm to the promoter 
(assignee). It is submitted that the bare covenant not to compete157 is not a valid 
restraint of trade. Therefore, the compensation received by or accrued to 
sportspersons for the exploitation of image rights should not be classified as a restraint 
of trade payment.  
The validity of restraint of trade has to be evaluated on the facts of each transaction. 
If it is found that the restraint clause is a valid restraint of trade, the compensation shall 
be considered as a payment for the sterilisation of a sportsperson’s capital asset. 
 
152 See the overriding principles discussed in para 2.6.3.  
153 Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd V Ellis (1984) 2 All SA 583 (A). Per Rabie CJ at page 
602: “It is a principle of our law that agreements that are against the public interest cannot be enforced, 
and so one could say that an agreement that curbs someone's trade freedom against the public interest, 
and therefore unenforceable, is, if the circumstances of the particular case are such that the court 
considers that enforcement of the agreement would harm public interest.” 
154 Automotive Tooling Systems (Pty) Ltd v SJ Wilkens (2006) 128 (RSA) at para 8. 
155 Super Safes (Pty) Ltd and Others v Voulgarides and Others (1975) 1 All SA 50 (W) at page 53. 
156 Reeves and Another v Marfield Insurance Brokers CC and Another [1996] (3) SA 766 (SCA) at para 
18.  




Therefore, the amount would be of a capital nature, but it would be specifically included 
in gross income under para (cB) if there is an employment relationship158 between a 
sportsperson and the image right assignee. If there is no employment relationship, the 
amount would be subject to capital gains tax.  
4.9. Conclusion  
It has been established that income emanating from the commercial exploitation of 
sportspersons’ image rights meets the requirements of gross income. The income 
arises from the productive employment of image rights, not from disposal. The income 
has been found to be of a revenue nature.   
Image right is an inherent personality right. It is a capital asset which is incapable of 
being disposed by a sportsperson as it is inherently bound to personality.   
The restraint provisions drawn from the image right regulations do not extend further 
than the duty not to compete. It has been established that such provisions do not 
amount to restraint of trade. However, each transaction has to be evaluated on its own 
facts to ascertain the substance of restraint.   
The following chapter provides a review of the 2018 Guide and considers the 
characterisation of income and the association of image rights with intellectual 














Chapter 5: Critical review of the 2018 Guide      
5.1. Introduction  
In 2018, the SARS issued a Guide on the taxation of professional sports clubs and 
players. The 2018 Guide (“Guide”) deals with, amongst other things, the income tax 
implications on image rights payments (refer to Annexure A). This chapter conducts a 
critical review of the relevant section of the Guide with the purpose of assessing the 
propriety of the inferences made. The chapter also considers whether the 2018 Guide 
accords with the regulations prescribed by the sport regulatory bodies and the various 
forms in which image rights are commercially exploited. A holistic approach will be 
adopted to consider other critical aspects that are not specifically dealt with in the 
Guide such as the characterisation of income and the income tax consequences 
associated with the protection of image rights in terms of intellectual property law and 
the subsequent commercial exploitation thereof.  
5.2. Review of the Guide 
The Guide states that image right payments refer to the payments that a player 
receives from an enterprise that uses such player’s image for advertising purposes. 
The statement only refers to an enterprise, therefore appears to disregard that image 
rights are also commercially exploited by sports clubs and national sport associations 
(federations) in a group or team context.159 However, the word ‘enterprise’ does not 
necessarily exclude sport clubs, but the position may differ with regard to national sport 
associations. National sport associations are generally associations of persons which 
are established for the administration and development of sport. These organisations 
are classified as either non-profit organisations (NPOs) or Public Benefit Organisations 
(PBOs).160  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines an “enterprise” as a commercial or industrial 
undertaking; a firm, a company, a business.161 The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) provides that enterprise applies to carrying on of 
 
159 Refer to para 4.6.3.  
160 See South African Football Association Statues. 2017. Available: https://www.safa.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/1.-SAFA-Statutes-Approved-on-21-Oct-17.pdf   [2019, July 15] at page 9; 
Cricket South Africa Integrated Report 2016/17. Available: https://ipublish.cc/wp/csa/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2014/12/2016-2017-Annual-Integrated-Report.pdf  [2019, July 15].  
161 Oxford English Dictionary (online). Available: https://www-oed-




any business.162 Contrastingly, the activities conducted by national associations do 
not constitute carrying on a business with a profit motive hence they are considered 
as NPOs or PBOs. It is clear that the Guide may have disregarded the fact that image 
rights payments can also be made by national sport association which are not 
classified as enterprises.   
The Guide further states that image rights are essentially personal rights that are 
vested in the player as an individual person. The Guide continues to indicate that these 
rights cannot be separated from the sportsperson, and consequently, cannot be 
disposed of or ‘sold’ to another person. This study has established that an image right 
is an aspect of a person’s personality property embodied in the concept of personality 
rights. As a result, a person may not transfer ownership of an image right.163 The 
assertion made in the Guide is therefore consistent with the findings in this study and 
therefore appropriate.   
The Guide concludes by indicating that payments made to a sportsperson for the right 
to use the sportsperson’s image right will be included in the sportsperson’s gross 
income (Own emphasis). It is clear that the Guide holds that is the right to use that is 
transferred and not the image itself. This is consistent with the conclusion made in 
Chapter 4. However, the Guide does not sufficiently address the classification of 
income, as it does not guide the reader about the test applied or that should be applied 
to determine the nature of income.164 In its current form, the Guide does not go far 
enough in its attempt to reduce uncertainty about the classification of income.   
5.3. Characterisation of income  
The Guide does not provide guidelines as to how the income should be characterised, 
save for when a payment is made by a sport club. The characterisation of income is 
critical since income is subject to tax based on its character.165 The following section 
 
162 OECD. 2014. Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed version. OECD 
Publishing; for the purposes of income tax, carrying on a business is similar to carrying on a trade. 
Notwithstanding that, an enterprise does not necessarily have to make profit to be classified as a 
carrying on a trade, but there must be real hope to make a profit based on the reasonable possibility 
(ITC 1292 (1979) 41 SATC 163). It submitted that the activities carried on by the sports clubs depict an 
element of trade but not those conducted by the national sports associations. 
163 Refer to para 4.6.3 above.  
164 The Guide merely concludes that image rights payments should be included in the sportsperson’s 
gross income by referring to ITC 1735 as support.  
165 The character of income determines under which para of the definition of gross income should an 





examines whether the income should be characterised as remuneration, business 
income, royalty income, service or other income.  
5.3.1. Remuneration  
In terms of the regulations prescribed by the rugby166, cricket167 and football168 bodies, 
an affiliation between a professional sportsperson and a sport club is formulated by a 
contract of employment. Therefore, a professional sportsperson and a sport club 
qualify as an employee169 and employer,170 respectively as envisaged in para 1 of the 
Fourth Schedule to the ITA.  
In terms of para 1 of the Fourth Schedule to the ITA, any amount of income which is 
paid or is payable to any person by way of any salary, leave pay, wage, overtime pay, 
bonus, gratuity, commission, fee, emolument, pension, superannuation allowance, 
retiring allowance or stipend, whether in cash or otherwise and whether or not in 
respect of services rendered is classified as a ‘remuneration’.171 The remuneration is 
a product of an employment relationship between an employee and employer.  
It follows that when an employer (sport club) makes an image right payment to an 
employee (sportsperson) the income should be characterised as remuneration. This 
is by virtue of the employment relationship regardless of whether a sportsperson is or 
not required to perform any form of service (i.e. act or pose for a television commercial 
 
such income. For example, when the income is characterised as remuneration, only expenses which 
are sufficiently connected to the realisation of employment income may be deducted against the 
income.  
166 “Player contract” means a contract of employment between a Province and a player. In relation to 
rugby, a “player” means is any person rendering rugby playing services to a Province in return for 
remuneration; See the 2018 Rugby Collective agreement at page 3-4.   
167 Professional cricket players are contracted as employees of their respective unions or clubs; See 
Louw, A. 2012. Sports law in South Africa. 2nd ed. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p 230.  
168 A contracted player is a professional player who has entered into a written contract of employment 
with a club. Every club employing a professional player must have a written contract with the player; 
See 2012 National Soccer League Rules, para 1.8 and 37.1 at page 1 and 47.  
169 “employee” means—(a) any person (other than a company) who receives any remuneration or to 
whom any remuneration accrues; (b) any person who receives any remuneration or to whom any 
remuneration accrues by reason of any service rendered by such person to or on behalf of a labour 
broker; See Para 1 of the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962.  
170 “employer” means any person (excluding any person not acting as a principal, but including any 
person acting in a fiduciary capacity or in his capacity as a trustee in an insolvent estate, an executor 
or an administrator of a benefit fund, pension fund, pension preservation fund, provident fund, provident 
preservation fund, retirement annuity fund or any other fund) who pays or is liable to pay to any person 
any amount by way of remuneration, and any person responsible for the payment of any amount by 
way of remuneration to any person under the provisions of any law or out of public funds (including the 
funds of any provincial council or any administration or undertaking of the State) or out of funds voted 
by Parliament or a provincial council; See Para 1 of the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act No. 58 
of 1962. 




advertisement). In this regard the sport clubs would be required to withhold employees’ 
tax on image rights payments and pay it over to SARS within the prescribed period. 
5.3.2. Business income  
The income earned by sportspersons who participate in a team sport and employed 
by clubs would not be characterised as business income since sportspersons are not 
considered to be carrying on a business but are employees. The income may however 
be characterised as business income when a sportsperson has registered a facet of 
an image as a trademark172 and such trademark is held in an ‘image rights 
company’.173 In this case, the income would accrue to the company and it would form 
part of the company’s business income.174  
5.3.3. Royalty  
In ITC 1735 supra, the court found that the income earned by a golfer is not a royalty 
fee since a player’s name, likeness, biographical details are not of a creative effort.175 
For the purpose of withholding tax, a ‘royalty’ is defined as an amount that is received 
or accrues in respect of the use or right of use of or permission to use any intellectual 
property as defined in section 23I of the ITA.176  
An image right does not form part of the identified properties contained in the definition 
of intellectual property.177 In CSARS v SA Silicone Products (Pty) Ltd178 the majority 
judgement interpreted the term ‘property or right of a similar nature’ and is 
encapsulated as follows:     
“The expression, properly interpreted, requires… that any property which is similar in 
nature shall possess fundamental characteristics common to those possessed by the 
specifically identified properties; minor or superficial similarities will not of themselves 
 
172 Refer to para 5.4 below.  
173 See discussion of the UK and US perspective in Chapter 6. 
174 Cloete, R. 2012. The taxation of image rights: A comparative analysis. 45(3). p. 559. 
175 (2002) 64 SATC 455 at para 12. 
176 Section 49A of the Income Tax Act No.58 of 1962.  
177 “intellectual property” means any— 
(a) patent as defined in the Patents Act including any application for a patent in terms of that Act; 
(b) design as defined in the Designs Act; 
(c) trade mark as defined in the Trade Marks Act; 
(d) copyright as defined in the Copyright Act; 
(e) patent, design, trade mark or copyright defined or described in any similar law to that in paragraph 
(a), (b), (c) or (d) of a country other than the Republic; 
(f) property or right of a similar nature to that in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e); and 
(g) knowledge connected to the use of such patent, design, trade mark, copyright, property or right. 




suffice…The common natures of the identified properties,… embrace their intellectual 
origins, i.e. their derivation from a creative mind, their potential for commercial 
exploitation, the fact that the law regards such exploitation as creating a justifiable 
monopoly which is available only to the creator of the property or persons to whom the 
creator transfers his rights according to law and that the law accords the rights and 
protection of ownership to such property.”179 
It is clear from the above that an image right is not property or right of a similar nature. 
It follows that income generated from the commercial exploitation of an image right 
should not be characterised as a royalty. However, the income could be characterised 
as a royalty when a facet of an image that is commercially exploited has been 
protected in terms of the intellectual property statutes.180   
5.3.4. Service or other income 
The image rights contract provisions may require sportspersons to make 
appearances, act or pose in advertisement which promotes the enterprise’s goods or 
services. These acts can be considered as services rendered in an activity unrelated 
to sport. In this regard, the income would not be characterised as remuneration since 
there would be no employment relationship between a sportsperson and an enterprise. 
It submitted that when an image is commercially exploited by an enterprise, the income 
should be characterised as income from services. Moreover, there is also no 
employment relationship between a sportsperson and a national sport association.181 
It is submitted that when a national sport association commercially exploits a player’s 
image right, the income should also be characterised as services income.  
When a sportsperson is not required by an association or enterprise to perform any 
form of service in the process of image right exploitation, the income may be generally 
characterised as other income.   
5.4. Intellectual property  
Intellectual property is a product of intellect, skill, labour which includes inventions, 
designs, names, symbols, literary and artistic works. These products can be protected 
 
179 Ibid at page 139. 
180 Refer to para 5.4 below. 
181 See World International Property Organisation. 2015. The Role of IP for Athletes and Image Rights. 
Available: 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_reg_ip_sport_sin_14/wipo_reg_ip_sport_sin_14_t_




by the provisions of the intellectual property statutes. The relevant statutes for this 
study are the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 (“the Trade Marks Act”) and Copyright Act 
98 of 1978 (“the Copyright Act”).  
The development of sport into an entertainment industry has led to the use of 
intellectual property law by sportspersons as a means to safeguard their names, 
name, likeness and other aspects of persona.182 It has become common for sports 
stars to protect their insignias under the intellectual property statutory provisions. 
Global super stars such as Usain Bolt183 and Lionel Messi184 are amongst many who 
have registered their insignias as trademarks.  
Locally, former players Naas Botha and Jacques Kallis are some of the sport 
personalities who have registered their names as trademarks.185 In addition to the 
trademark law, sportspersons are also able to apply the copyright law provisions to 
protect their images, although its application is limited since it is designed to protect 
creative works.  
The purpose of the following section is to outline how sportspersons can obtain 
proprietary interest on their aspect of identity (image) and the income tax 
consequences emanating from the subsequent commercial exploitation thereof.    
5.4.1. Trademark  
A trademark is defined as:  
“a mark used or proposed to be used by a person in relation to goods or services for 
the purpose of distinguishing the goods or services in relation to which the mark is 
used or proposed to be used from the same kind of goods or services connected in 
the course of trade with any other person.”186 
A ‘mark’ is any sign capable of being represented graphically, including a device, 
name, signature, word, letter, numeral, shape, configuration, pattern, ornamentation, 
colour or container for goods or any combination of the aforementioned.187 Whereas 
 
182 Sport stars are considered to be celebrities and their images are valuable assets in the world of 
advertising, refer to para 2.4.   
183 The sport star registered the phrase “Bolt to the World” which symbolises his signature victory pose. 
184 The footballer registered the term “LE0 MESS1” which is basically a combination of his name and 
squad shirt number.  
185 Cloete, R. Ed. 2005. Introduction to sports law in South Africa. Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths. p 
177. 





a ‘sign’ is a mark, symbol, or device that has some special significance, or 
distinguishes the person or thing on which it is put.188 The terms can be used 
interchangeably as one includes the other.   
The purpose of a trademark is to distinguish goods or services of a person or an 
enterprise from those of the others. The registration of a mark or sign as a trademark 
indicates an intention to use it as a tool of trade. By a successful registration of a 
trademark, the holder gains an exclusive right to use the registered mark or sign in a 
specific class or classes of goods or services.189  Sportspersons are able to protect 
image rights by registering qualifying facets of image (name, signature, nickname and 
other aspects of persona) with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission 
(CIPC) when such aspect of image is used or intended to be used for trade, it is 
capable of visual representation190, distinguishing the goods or services of a 
sportsperson from another person.191   
5.4.2. Copyright  
The Copyright Act does not contain a definition of a 'copyright’, however the Act 
indicates the works in which a copyright may vest.192 The copyright law vests an 
exclusive right in the author193 of an eligible work194. Moreover, prevents others from 
copying the works.195  
The mere qualification of a work as a subject of a copyright does not render it inevitably 
protected by the copyright law. However, the work must be original196 and reduced to 
a material form.197 Therefore, in order for sportspersons to secure protection of image 
 
188 The Oxford English Dictionary [online]. Available: https://www-oed-
com.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/view/Entry/179512?rskey=O93U4t&result=1#eid [2019, June 30]. 
189 The Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for 
the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 1957.  
190 See definition of a ‘mark’ and a ‘sign’ above.  
191 Section 9(1) of the Trade Marks Act No. 194 of 1993. 
192 Between section 6 and section 11B of the Copyright Act, it is provided that a copyright vests in 
literary or music work, artistic works, cinematograph film, sound recording, broadcast and programme.   
193 Section 1 of the Copyright Act defines an “author” in relation to the nature of the work.  
194 Section 2 of the Copyright Act states the items which qualify as eligible work. 
195 Ramsden, P.A. 2011. A guide to intellectual property law. Claremont, South Africa: Juta. p. 1.  
196 Section 2(1) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. A work is original when the author applied own skill, 
knowledge and labour in the creation of the work.  
197 Section 2(2) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, a work shall not be eligible for copyright unless it has 
been written down, recorded, represented in digital data or signals or otherwise reduced to a material 
form. Section (2A) Copyright Act 98 of 1978, a broadcast or a programme-carrying signal shall not be 
eligible for copyright until, in the case of a broadcast, it has been broadcast and, in the case of a 




rights in terms of the copyright law, that facet of image must be original and reduced 
to a material form. When the work satisfies the requirements of the copyright law, the 
copyright will subsist automatically in the player’s creation (work), no formal procedure 
of registration is required.198  
The subsisting of a copyright in a sportsperson’s facet of image can best be illustrated 
by an example. 
Player A exercises skill and labour in the commissioning and producing a sound 
recording199 which contains personal voice and such recording can be saved in a 
computer program. Player A is therefore regarded as a creator or an author of the 
sound recording. The copyright will subsist in Player A’s sound recording, 
consequently the player secures proprietary interest in the sound recording. Then no 
third party may broadcast, transmit or play such recording without Player A’s consent 
and the grant of permission could be done in exchange for a fee.200  
The protection of a facet of an image in terms of the trademark or copyright law creates 
a proprietary right (immaterial asset) which is distinct from the individual201 and can be 
alienated.202 The proprietary right exists independently of the sportsperson’s 
personality rights and are enforced separately.203 The proprietary right generated by 
the registration of a trademark or subsisting of a copyright can be disposed or licensed 
to sports clubs, national associations and enterprises for use in promotional activities. 
The following section examines the income tax treatment of income generated from a 
disposal and licensing of the property right. The discussion is confined to the revenue 
 
198 Louw, A. 2012. Sports law in South Africa. 2nd ed. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 
454.  
199 Section 2(1)(e) of the Copyright Act. Sound recording which contains the voice of a sportsperson is 
a facet of image and an eligible work in terms of section 2 of the Copyright Act; a voice recording is one 
of the facets of image provided by Cloete in the definition of image rights, refer to para 2.2.1. 
200 Section 9A of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
201 Louw, A. 2012. Sports law in South Africa. 2nd ed. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 
464 – 491 and Cornelius, S. 2011. Image rights. In Handbook on international sports law. Nafziger, J. 
A. R. & Ross, S. F. Eds. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. p. 497 – 517. 
202 Ramsden, P.A. 2011. A guide to intellectual property law. Claremont, South Africa: Juta. p. 1.  
203 A facet of an image which has been recognised in terms of the copyright or trademark law is not 
attached to a sportsperson’s personality right. The recognition of an aspect of image in terms of the 
intellectual property statutes creates a property right which is disposable. Contrasting to an aspect of 
image which has not been safeguarded in terms of the legislation and is thus a personal right which 




versus capital component of the gross income204 definition since the other components 
discussed in Chapter 4 remain constant.    
5.5. Disposal of a trademark or a copyright  
A sportsperson would be considered to have disposed a trademark or a copyright 
when the risks and rewards associated therewith are transferred to another party.  
The courts have laid down a number of tests to determine the nature of income 
generated from the disposal of an asset. The dominant test is the intention of a 
taxpayer which was formulated in CIR v Stott205. In this case, the court had to 
determine the nature of income derived from the sale of land. Wessels JA remarked 
as follows:   
“…intention was an important factor and unless some other factor intervened to show 
that when the article was sold it was sold in pursuance of a scheme of profit – making, 
it was conclusive in determining whether it was capital or gross income.”206 
In the dissenting judgment of Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SBI207, Corbett JA 
indicated when the intention of the taxpayer should be considered by stating the 
following:    
“…the intention of the taxpayer, both at the time of acquiring the asset and at the time 
of its sale, is of great, and sometimes decisive, importance. Other significant factors 
include, inter alia, the actual activities of the taxpayer in relation to the asset in 
question, the manner of its realization, the taxpayer's other business operations (if 
any).”208 
It is clear that the intention behind the acquisition of an asset is an important factor 
and the intention is considered throughout the period of holding that asset.209 
However, there may be a change of intention during the period of holding an asset.  
 
204 Gross income is defined in section 1 of the ITA as follows: “in relation to any year or period of 
assessment, means – (i) in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received 
by or accrued to or in favour of such resident;…  during such year or period of assessment. 
205 (1928) 3 SATC 253. 
206 Ibid at page 262. 
207 (1978) 39 SATC 163. 
208 Ibid at page 181. 
209 The intention is derived from the taxpayer’s own evidence (ipse dexit) or reasons for acquiring the 
asset. However, the taxpayer’s ipse dexit is not decisive where there are other objective factors which 
intervene to conflict the taxpayer’s ipse dexit, if there are other objective factors the courts place minimal 




In Natal Estates Ltd v SIR it was decided that from the totality of facts one enquires 
[has to enquire] whether it can be said that the owner had crossed the Rubicon and 
gone over to the business, or embarked upon a scheme, of selling such land for profit, 
using the land as his stock-in-trade.210 In John Bell & Co (Pty) Ltd v SIR the court held 
that the mere change of intention to dispose of the assert is not sufficient to indicate a 
change of intention, something more is required to metamorphose the character of the 
asset and so render its proceeds gross income.211 
The income earned from the disposal of an asset which was acquired for keeps (i.e. 
hold as investment) and where there has been no change of intention to 
metamorphose its character is considered to be of a capital nature. However, when 
an asset is disposed in an operation of a business of carrying out a scheme of profit-
making, the income is considered to be of a revenue nature.212 
In CIR v Visser213 the court described income as a product of capital or something in 
the nature of the fruit as opposed to a tree. In other words, income is what capital 
produces.214 It follows that when a sportsperson disposes a trademark or copyright 
(immaterial asset) which is held for the purpose of producing income (i.e. the tree), the 
income would be of a capital nature. However, when the income represents the fruit, 
it is of a revenue nature.215 
In relation to sportspersons, the intention behind the creation of an immaterial asset 
(proprietary right) would typically be to protect an image right against misappropriation 
and possibly earn income from its application in promotional activities. It is submitted 
that when an immaterial asset is created for this purpose and where there is no 
subsequent change of intention, the income generated from its sale would be of a 
capital nature and be subject to capital gains tax implications. Conversely, when an 
immaterial asset (proprietary right) is disposed in an operation of a business in a 
scheme of profit-making it is likely to be of a revenue nature and included in the 
 
210 (1975) 37 SATC 193 at page 220. 
211 (1976) 38 SATC 87 at page 103. 
212 Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd v CIR (1926) 2 SATC 71 at page 75. It was held that “where ‘a gain 
is made by an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit making,’ then it was revenue 
derived from capital productively employed, and must be income.” 
213 (1937) TPD 77 at page 81. 
214 The test is not universal as what is capital in the hands of one taxpayer may be revenue in the hands 
of another. For example, fixed property is regarded as an investment in the hands of an investor 
whereas it is trading stock in the hands of a property dealer. 




sportsperson’s gross income which is subject to normal tax. The outcome would 
depend on the specific facts and merits of each case.    
5.6. Capital gains tax  
When it is shown that the income generated from the disposal of an immaterial asset 
is of a capital nature, the income is not completely disregarded but considered under 
the provisions of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA. When a trademark or copyright is 
disposed at a profit, the profit will be subject to capital gains tax, and when at a loss, 
the capital loss will be set off against other capital profits.216 
The capital gains tax is imposed when there is a disposal of an asset for proceeds that 
exceeds the base cost.217 The excess amount is regarded as a capital gain.218 The 
taxable portion of capital gain is included in taxable income in terms of section 26A of 
the ITA and is subject to normal tax. Therefore, capital gains tax is not a separate tax 
but forms part of income tax. 
The main components of capital gains tax are; asset219, disposal220, proceeds221 and 
base cost222. The definition of an “asset” is sufficiently wide to include trademarks and 
copyrights developed by the protection of a sportsperson’s aspect image as discussed 
in para 5.4.  
When a sportsperson disposes or transfers ownership of a trademark or copyright to 
any party, the transaction is classified as a disposal as envisaged in para 11 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the ITA.  
 
216 Haupt, P. 2014. Notes on South African Income Tax. 3rd ed. Roggebaai South Africa: H & H 
Publications. p. 693. 
217 Olivier, L. 2012. Capital versus revenue: some guidance: Notes. 45(1):172-177.  
218 Para 3 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962. 
219 Para 1 of the Eighth Schedule - “asset” includes—(a) property of whatever nature, whether movable 
or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, excluding any currency, but including any coin made mainly 
from gold or platinum; and (b) a right or interest of whatever nature to or in such property. 
220 Para 11 of the Eighth Schedule – “disposal” is any event, act, forbearance or operation of law which 
results in the creation, variation, transfer or extinction of an asset, and includes, inter alia, the sale or 
transfer of ownership of an asset.  
221 Para 35(1) of the Eighth Schedule – “proceeds” from the disposal of an asset by a person are equal 
to the amount received by or accrued to, or which is treated as having been received by, or accrued to 
or in favour of, that person in respect of that disposal.   
222 Para 20(1) of the Eighth Schedule – “base cost” is the sum of — (a) the expenditure actually incurred 
in respect of the cost of acquisition or creation of that asset; (b) the expenditure actually incurred in 
respect of the valuation of the asset for the purpose of determining a capital gain or capital loss in 





The consideration received by or accrued to or in favour of a sportsperson whether in 
cash or otherwise223 from the disposal of a trademark or copyright qualify as proceeds 
for capital gains tax purposes.  
The expenditure incurred by sportspersons for the registration, creation and valuation 
of a trademark or copyright will form part of the base cost in terms of para 20(1) of the 
Eighth Schedule. However, expenditure that has been allowed as a deduction in the 
determination of a taxpayer’s taxable income would be excluded from a base cost of 
an asset in terms of para 20(3) of the Eighth Schedule.  
5.7. The licensing of a trademark or a copyright  
The sportspersons may opt for the licensing of the right to use trademark or copyright 
in lieu of an outright disposal. In this case, the risks and rewards associated with the 
ownership of the assets remains with the holder.224 A licensee only obtains the right 
to use the proprietary right for a determined a period in exchange for a fee.  
In COT v Booysen supra the court formulated a test of determining the nature of 
income where there is no change of ownership. Wessels J stated:   
“…but it may safely be asserted that the revenue or profit which is derived from a thing 
without its changing owners is rather to be considered as income than as capital. On 
the other hand, the profit which is derived from a thing when it changes owners is rather 
of the nature of capital than of income.”225 
It was further held in the same case that income considered in relation to capital is 
revenue derived from capital productively employed.226 It follows that when a 
sportsperson licenses the right to use the proprietary right, the income is considered 
to be from the productive employment of capital and included in gross income. The 
income should be characterised as a royalty227 and included in taxable income in terms 
of para g(iii) of the definition of gross income. 
5.8. Conclusion  
The Guide provides as follows; an image right cannot be separated from an individual, 
image rights payments forms part of the sportsperson’s gross income and the income 
 
223 See para 4.3.   
224 Refer to para 4.6.4 about the change of ownership.   
225 (1918) 32 SATC 10 at page 15 – 16. 
226 Ibid at page 25. 




is characterised as remuneration when the payment is made by a sport club. These 
observations are consistent with what has been established in this study. However, 
the Guide is not sufficiently comprehensive, and it fails to guide a reader about the test 
that was or should be applied to determine the nature of income. Therefore, the Guide 
does not go as far in an attempt to reduce uncertainty concerning the income tax 
treatment of image rights payments and the critical aspect of the characterisation of 
income. In addition to this, the Guide does not consider the income tax consequences 
emanating from the recognition and protection of a facet of image in terms of the 
trademark or copyright law. 
It has been established that when an image right is commercially exploited by parties 
which do not have employment relationships with sportspersons, income should be 
characterised as services or other income. If the facet of image commercially exploited 
is protected under the trademark or copyright law, the income generated therefrom 
should be characterised as a royalty and when such right is held in an ‘image rights 
company’ the income should be considered as business income.  
The following chapter conducts a comparative review for the purpose of assessing 












Chapter 6: International perspective   
6.1. Introduction  
The concept of commercial exploitation of image rights is still emerging in South Africa. 
It is therefore necessary to compare the practice and income tax treatment with other 
jurisdictions wherein the concept is firmly established to assess international best 
practice. This chapter aims to explore the practice of commercial exploitation of 
resident sportspersons’ image rights and income tax implications thereof in the UK 
and USA. Due to the limited nature of the study, the following analysis does not delve 
into details about the income tax system of the aforementioned jurisdictions.     
6.2. United Kingdom   
Recognition and protection of image rights   
The UK intellectual property law does not recognise an image right as a separate 
standalone right.228 The concept of image rights includes various intellectual property 
rights such as contractual rights, trademarks, goodwill or copyrights.229  
In the UK there is no specific law that provides for general legal protection of 
personality (image rights).230 However, a person’s image is protected against 
unauthorised use in terms of the common law tort of passing off.231 In addition to this, 
Coors argues that in the absence of statutory protection of image rights, craftily drafted 
image rights agreements can be an effective way of protecting image rights.232   
Taxation of sportspersons    
 
228 Offer, K. 2018. The Taxation of Image Rights. International Tax Specialist Group Global Tax Journal. 
1(1): 26 – 31. 
229 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. 2014. Employment Income Manual. Available: 
https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/employment-income-manual/eim00732  [2019, August 10]. 
230 Blackshaw, I, S. 2012. Sports marketing agreements: legal, fiscal and practical aspects. The Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser. p. 380. 
231 In Irvine v Talkpsport (2003) 2 All ER 881 (CA) , it was found that the manipulation of the claimant’s 
photograph to appear as if he was holding a portable radio created a false impression that he endorsed 
a radio station and as a result could confuse the public. The court found that the claimant’s photograph 
is protected against unauthorised exploitation in terms of common law tort of passing off; in order for a 
party to succeed in the claim based on the common law of passing off – firstly, at the time when 
misappropriation of an image took place, the claimant should have already acquired some measure of 
fame and, secondly, the conduct complained of must be of such a nature that it would create an 
impression. See Cornelius, S. 2011. Image rights. In Handbook on international sports law. Nafziger, J. 
A. R. & Ross, S. F. Eds. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. p. 501. 
232 Coors, C. 2015. Are sports image rights assets? A legal, economic and tax perspective. The 





In the UK, resident233 sportspersons are subject to tax on their worldwide income and 
capital gains. In terms of section 7 of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 
2003, income includes earnings from employment and secondary earnings (i.e. rental 
income, endorsement income etc.). As employees of sports clubs, sportspersons are 
required to pay employees’ tax and National Insurance Contributions (NICs) on their 
employment income in terms of the PAYE system.234 The secondary earnings are 
subject to normal income tax at progressive graduate tax rates.   
Income tax treatment of image rights payments  
The sportspersons typically execute the commercial exploitation of image rights by 
launching an image rights company (IRC).235 This arrangement works as follows: a 
sportsperson transfers an image right to the IRC, and then enters into an agreement 
to perform promotional service for the IRC, and the IRC then licences the 
sportsperson’s image right to third parties in return for payments.236  
The arrangements which involve the use of IRC to exploit image rights have been 
scrutinised by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). HMRC consider the use 
of IRCs as a technique designed to reduce tax liability.237 In Sports Club, Evelyn and 
Joycelyn v HM Inspector of Taxes238, the Inland Revenue (now HMRC) challenged 
image rights agreements concluded by Arsenal Football Club and two IRCs which held 
image rights of its two contracted players. The club secured the rights to commercially 
exploit the players’ images from their respective companies in return for fees. The 
Inland Revenue argued that fees paid to the IRCs were made in pursuant of the 
players employment contracts therefore should be classified as employment income 
 
233 See Schedule 45, Part 1, of the Finance Act 2013. Schedule 45 sets out the rules for determining 
whether individuals are residents or non-residents in the UK. The basic rules provides that an individual 
is a resident in the UK for a tax year if the automatic residence test is met for that year, or the sufficient 
ties test is met for that year and if neither of these tests are met for that year, an individual is not resident 
in the UK for that year. 
234 Cloete, R. 2012. The taxation of image rights: a comparative analysis. 45(3). p. 560 
235 Harrington, D. & White, N. 2005. United Kingdom. In Sports Image Rights in Europe. Blackshaw, 
I.S. & Siekmann, R.C. R, Eds.The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. 315 – 343. p. 335.  
236 Supra cite note 233 at page 562.   
237 If the payment for the use of image accrues to the IRC, the amount is subject to tax at corporation 
tax at 19%, whereas if it accrues to high earning sportsperson it could be taxed at the higher tax rate of 
46%. Furthermore, when a player’s image right is held in an IRC, the payment for the right to use image 
made by a sport club does not attract employees’ tax and NIC. 




(emoluments) and be subject to employees’ tax and NIC. The revenue authority 
considered the arrangements to be a ‘smokescreen’ designed to disguise employment 
income as image rights payments and therefore reduce tax liability.239 The tax tribunal 
held that the image rights agreements were genuine commercial arrangements with 
an independent value and separate from employment. The tax tribunal concluded that 
the fees were not subject to employees’ tax and NICs. The tribunal’s decision has 
been seen as a watershed as the revenue authority has departed from the notion of 
not recognising image rights to currently recognise image rights as capital assets for 
tax purposes.240  
In HMRC v Portsmouth City Football Club Ltd241 the court dismissed HMRC’s 
contention that there was no proper basis for image rights payments, and that they 
were, in effect shams. The court held that a club is entitled pay, and a player is entitled 
to receive image rights payments for use of image in publicity and other material. 
Moreover, when a payment is properly made for an image right, the club is not obliged 
to account for employees’ tax and NIC.   
HMRC’s Guidelines   
In August 2017, HMRC published guidelines for tax on payments for the use of image 
rights.242 The guidelines are not considered to be binding law but advances HMRC’s 
position on the interpretation of law. The Guide provides that image rights payments 
can be taxable in three different ways. Firstly, payments made to a self-employed 
individual are taxable as professional income. Secondly, payments to employees for 
employment duties must be taxed as earnings subject to PAYE and not as payments 
for the use of image rights. Thirdly, where image rights payments are made to the 
company, the company will pay UK Corporation Tax on its profits. Where the individual 
(sportsperson) is a director or shareholder of that company, they may receive a 
financial reward, such as salary or dividends and this income would be subject to tax 
 
239 If the image right fee is regarded as employment income in the hands of a sportsperson it could be 
subject to tax at a higher tax rate of 46%, whereas if it is genuinely accruing to the image rights 
companies it is subject to tax at a lower corporate tax rate at 19% and the club is not required to withhold 
employees tax and NIC.    
240 Cloete, R. 2012. The taxation of image rights: a comparative analysis. 45(3). p. 561.  
241 (2010) EWHC 2013 (Ch) at para 19 and 88. 
242 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. 2017. Tax on payments for use of image rights. Available: 




under normal provisions. The guide then refers to HMRC Employment Income Manual 
for further details on the taxation of image rights payments. 
The HMRC Employment Income Manual indicate that HMRC accepts that when an 
image right arrangement has an independent value and is commercially justifiable, the 
payment for the use of sportsperson’s image will not be considered to be employment 
income.243 The Guide then considers the deduction of tax at source and goes further 
to provide that in terms of section 579(2) of the Income Tax (Trading and Other 
Income) Act (“ITTOIA”) 2005 some or all rights that make up image rights are likely to 
meet the definition of intellectual property (at EIM00736). As a result, the payment for 
an image right which has an independent value in a genuine commercial arrangement 
should be classified as a royalty or other income earned from intellectual property. The 
party that makes the image right payment may be required to withhold income tax at 
source under Part 15 of the Income Tax Act 2007. 
The Capital Gains Manual includes commentary on the assignment or licensing of 
image rights to third parties. The Guide indicates that the asset assigned or licenced 
in an image right agreement is likely to be goodwill244 (at CG68420). It further provides 
that the transfer of image rights to IRCs is achievable by a licensing arrangement, 
rather than an outright assignment (at CG68425). The licensing of an image right to 
an IRC is a part disposal245 in terms of section 21(2)(b) Taxation of Chargeable Gains 
Act 1992 (at CG12730). It follows that a transfer of an image right by a sportsperson 
to an IRC is a disposal of a capital asset for capital gains tax purposes. 
It is clear that when an image right has an independent value and the arrangement is 
commercially justifiable, the payment for the use of the right is separable from 
employment income. Moreover, the income earned by the IRC or sportspersons (when 
there is no use of IRC) is characterised as royalty or other income from intellectual 
 
243 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. 2014. Employment Income Manual. Available: 
https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/employment-income-manual/eim00735  [2019, August 10]. 
244 Goodwill is a personal property and its ownership can be transferred by assignment, but it cannot 
be assigned “in gross” - separate from the business to which it relates. An assignment in gross is invalid 
and the assignee acquires no rights from such a purported assignment. However, the determination of 
whether an assignment is in gross is conducted on the facts of each individual case; See Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs. 2016. Capital Gains Manual at CG 68420. 
245 For capital gains purposes a ‘disposal’ includes a ‘part- disposal’, which may be the disposal of a 
physical part of the asset, or an interest or right in or over the whole or part of the asset; See Her 




property and is subject to tax as such. The IRC can attribute income to a sportsperson 
as dividends, salary, director’s fee, etc. subject to the status of the relationship 
between a sportsperson and the IRC. 
6.3. United States of America 
Recognition and protection of image rights  
In the US image rights are known as publicity rights246 recognised under the concept 
of right of publicity.247 Right of publicity is defined as an inherent right that every human 
being has to control the commercial use of his or her identity.248  
The right of publicity is recognised differently by various States. Dreyer reports that in 
some States the right is recognised in terms of common law while it forms part of 
statutory provisions in other States.249 Image rights therefore find protection in terms 
of the common law right of publicity250 and statutory right of publicity251 depending on 
the position of the concerned State.    
Taxation of sportspersons 
General 
The US taxes its citizens and residents on their worldwide income and gains 
regardless of the source. An individual is considered as a US tax resident if is lawfully 
 
246 Blackshaw, I, S. 2012. Sports marketing agreements: legal, fiscal and practical aspects. The Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser. p. 265. 
247 The rights general purpose is to first, recognise the economic value of an individual’s identity. 
Secondly, the publicity right is an incentive for creativity, encouraging the production of entertaining and 
intellectual works. Finally, the right prevents unjust enrichment of those who usurp the identity of 
another. See Wolohan, J. 2005. United States. In Sports Image Rights in Europe. Blackshaw, I.S. & 
Siekmann, R.C.R, Eds. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. p. 352. 
248 Dreyer, A. 2011. Recent sports-related issues in US intellectual property law. In Handbook on 
international sports law. Nafziger, J. A. R. & Ross, S. F. Eds. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. p. 468 – 
469. The right of publicity is not recognised by federal law, but it is determined by state law typically 
from courts decisions. The term ‘right of publicity’ has its origin from the case of Haelan Laboratories 
Inc v Topps Chewing Gum Inc, 202 F 2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) where it was recognised that a man has a 
right in the publicity value of his photograph.  
249 Ibid. 
250 Wolohan, J. 2005. United States. In Sports Image Rights in Europe. Blackshaw, I.S. & Siekmann, 
R.C.R, Eds. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. p. 354 -356. In order to establish a course of action for 
common law misappropriation, the courts have generally held that an individual must demonstrate that 
the defendant used the plaintiff’s identity; the appropriation of plaintiff name, or likeness provided the 
defendant some advantage, commercially or otherwise; lack of consent and resulting injury. The terms 
‘right of publicity’ and ‘common law misappropriation’ are used interchangeably.  
251 Ibid. p. 356 - 358. The statutory cause of action is available when a plaintiff can show that another 
knowingly used his or her name,… photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, 
merchandise, or goods, or for the purpose of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchase of, products, 




admitted for permanent residence, meets the substantial residence test or has made 
an election for residence.252  
In terms of section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, ‘gross income’ includes 
all income from whatever source derived. It is submitted that the ‘gross income’ 
definition is sufficiently wide to include income earned by sportspersons from the 
commercial exploitation of their image rights. Such income may be subject to tax under 
federal tax as well as state tax provisions.253  
Income tax treatment of image rights payments 
An image right (publicity right) of a famous person is a property right (similar to a 
trademark) which could be licensed or transferred.254 According to a licensing 
agreement, a licensor grants the right to use but retains the title. The transfer of an 
image right is not regarded as a sale or exchange of capital asset.255 Therefore, the 
gain realised from the transfer of an image right is subject to tax as ordinary income, 
not as capital gain.256  
In the USA, sportspersons typically execute the exploitation of image rights through 
structures such as IRC or trusts or in an individual personal capacity. The income 
generated from the use of a sportsperson’s image is characterised as a royalty.257 
 
252 Section 7701(b) Internal Revenue Code of 1986.  
253 Federal income tax is levied by the Inland Revenue Service on the taxable income of individuals, 
corporations, trusts, and other legal entities at the progressive tax rate. The tax collected is credited to 
the country’s government account. The taxpayers may also be subject to tax in their resident states and 
the tax collected in this regard is credited to the account of the individual state.  
254 Dreyer, A. 2011. Recent sports-related issues in US intellectual property law. In Handbook on 
international sports law. Nafziger, J. A. R. & Ross, S. F. Eds. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. p. 468 – 
469; Cepeda v Swift & Co, 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir.1969), per Judge Mehaffy: “The propriety of summary 
judgment by the court on issues involving interpretation of the contract is not challenged by either party. 
Such use of a summary judgment is desirable where, as here, the contract is unambiguous…, nor is it 
a matter of dispute that plaintiff has a valuable property right in his name, photograph and image and 
that he may sell these property rights. 
255 Section 1253 (a) on the Internal Revenue Code provides that as a general rule a transfer of a 
franchise, trademark, or trade name shall not be treated as a sale or exchange of a capital asset if the 
transferor retains any significant power, right, or continuing interest with respect to the subject matter 
of the franchise, trademark, or trade name. It is submitted that this is applicable to publicity rights as the 
sportspersons do not entirely discharge interest in their image rights but retains some of degree of 
interest or control to inter alia, negotiate for commercial exploitation with other parties when an 
endorsement agreement expires or contracts with another club.  
256 Section 1253 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that amounts received or accrued on 
account of a transfer, sale, or other disposition of a franchise, trademark, or trade name which are 
contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the franchise, trademark, or trade name transferred 
shall be treated as amounts received or accrued from the sale or other disposition of property which is 
not a capital asset. 
257 Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling 81-178, 1984-2 C.B. 135, 13. Payments for use of 




However, this may not always be the case since some image rights agreements 
constitute compound elements known as ‘on-course’ and ‘off-course’ endorsement 
contracts.258  
In Goosen v CIR259 the court had to determine whether ‘on-course’ endorsement fees 
received by a UK resident golfer from worldwide endorsement agreements were 
royalties or personal service income. The golfer participated in various golf 
tournaments that were held in the US, as a result the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
sought to tax the income earned by the sportsperson while performing in the US. 
According to the specifics of the agreements, the golfer was required to wear and use 
the companies’ (licensee’s) products while playing golf (‘on-course’ endorsement) and 
make appearances and pose for the companies’ television commercials (‘off-course’ 
endorsement) in exchange for endorsement fees. The IRS accepted that the ‘off-
course’ endorsement fees were royalties. The contentious issue was the ‘on-course’ 
endorsement fees of which the sportsperson characterised as 50% royalty income and 
50% personal service income. The IRS argued against the equal allocation of income 
on the basis that the sponsors paid the sportsperson primarily to perform personal 
service. The respondent also argued that any income received for the use of the 
golfer’s name and likeness is de minimis.  
The court found that endorsement fees could not be wholly attributed to the golfer’s 
image or personal service. It was held that that participation in the golf tournament 
was material to receiving income and therefore upheld the sportsperson’s equal 
apportionment of income between royalty and personal service.   
In Sergio Garcia v CIR,260 Garcia a Swiss tax resident golfer had signed an 
endorsement deal with a company that manufactures golf equipment and accessories. 
The company secured the right to use the sportsperson’s image in advertising (‘off-
course’ endorsement) and as part of the agreement the golfer was required to wear 
and use the company’s products while playing (‘on-course’ endorsement) in exchange 
for endorsement fees. The company and the golfer agreed that 85% of the 
 
258 An ‘on-course’ endorsement contract generally relates to an agreement in which a sportsperson is 
required to display an entity's name or logo on the apparel or equipment while performing a sport.  While 
an ‘off-course’ endorsement contract relates to the use of the player’s identity in advertising in an activity 
unrelated to sport or off the playing course. This can take place in the form of acting in commercial 
advertisement, sale of merchandise depicting a sportsperson’s name etc.  
259 (2011) 136 T.C. 547. 




endorsement fee is attributable to an image right (‘off-course’) and 15% to personal 
service. The IRS argued against this apportionment of income and asserted that a 
greater portion of the income was for personal service. The court considered expert 
evidence and the earlier judgement of Goosen supra. The court determined that the 
equal apportionment of income decided in Goosen case supra was not appropriate in 
this case since Garcia was a global icon, therefore his image was more valuable than 
Goosen’s. The court found that the endorsement fees should be apportioned at 65% 
royalty income and 35% personal service income.  
It is evident that in the US, the income generated from the commercial exploitation of 
an image right ‘off-course’ is classified as a royalty from the use of a valuable right 
(intangible asset). However, when an image right is commercially exploited through 
participation in a sport activity, the income could be apportioned between royalty 
income and personal service income based on the particular facts of each contract. 
6.4. Comparative analysis  
The UK law recognises an image right as a form of intellectual property.261 Similarly, 
in the USA an image right (publicity right) is considered to be a valuable property right 
similar to trademark.262 Conversely, the SA law does not recognise any proprietary 
interest in a person's name, likeness or any aspects of persona.263 However, this study 
has concluded that an image right could be considered as a capital asset for income 
tax purposes.264 
The South African law considers an image right to be a personal right, therefore it 
cannot be disposed or transferred to structures such as IRCs or trusts.265 In both the 
UK and USA, sportspersons are able transfer their image rights and commercially 
exploit through structures (IRC/trusts). The transfer of an image right to an IRC is 
regarded as a disposal of a capital asset in the UK whereas it is not considered a 
disposal of capital asset in the USA. Therefore, the amount realised from the transfer 
 
261 Refer to para 6.2. 
262 Refer to para 6.3. 
263 Refer to para 3.2. 
264 Refer para to 4.6.1. 
265 See para 4.6.3; a transfer is only possible when a facet of an image has been registered as a 
trademark or a copyright has subsisted in a sportsperson’s original work. In this the registration of a 




of image right to a structure (IRC/trust) is subject to CGT in the UK whilst in the USA 
it is taxed as ordinary income.  
The income generated from the genuine commercial exploitation (licensing) of a 
sportsperson’s image is characterised as royalty income in both the UK and USA. 
However, when a contract consists of compound elements, the income may be 
apportioned between royalty income, personal service income and or employment 
income subject to the facts of each case. In South Africa, SARS posit that image right 
payments made by sports club are characterised as remuneration. This study has also 
established that in terms of the current domestic laws when an image right is 
commercially exploited by an enterprise or federation the income may be 


















Chapter 7: Conclusion   
The aim of this study has been to determine the nature of income earned by rugby, 
cricket and football players from the commercial exploitation of their image rights. 
Furthermore, to assess the propriety of the 2018 Guide, particularly the section dealing 
with the income tax implications on image rights, and to consider income tax 
consequences emanating from the protection of images under intellectual property 
legislation.   
To achieve the research objective, it was necessary to define key terms, demonstrate 
what constitutes image rights, outline how image rights are commercially exploited and 
present the regulations stipulated by the relevant sport governing bodies vis-à-vis 
image rights (Chapter 2).  
Chapter 3 discussed the legal recognition and protection of image rights together with 
classification in respect of accounting and income tax provisions. The South African 
law does not recognise image rights as protectable property rights. However, an image 
right is regarded a personal right possessed by every individual. Notwithstanding the 
statutory non-recognition, image rights are protected against misappropriation in terms 
of common law of delict within the doctrine of personality rights and the constitutional 
right to privacy. 
In respect of the classification, image rights satisfy the accounting definition and 
recognition requirements of an asset and intangible asset, respectively. An image right 
can be recognised as an asset in the financial records of the assignee (sports club, 
national sport association or an enterprise) during the period when the assignee has 
control over the right to apply the sportsperson’s image in pursuance of economic 
benefits in the form of sales. Similarly, in respect of income tax provisions an image 
right is classifiable as an asset under para 1 of the Eighth Schedule since image rights 
of famous sportspersons have pecuniary value and an image right contract raises 
personal rights for contracting parties.  
In Chapter 4, an analysis of the legislation and case law was conducted to determine 
whether image rights payments satisfy the requirements of the gross income definition.  
To achieve this, the study assessed if an image right is a capital asset separable from 
an individual. An image right satisfies the test of a capital asset and should accordingly 




due to legal personality it cannot be disposed or separated from an individual. 
Therefore, regardless of the terms (transfer, license, assignment or dispose) used in 
an image right agreement or clause, in substance the agreement does not amount to 
a contract of sale. Since ownership of an image right cannot be transferred from a 
sportsperson to a sport club, national sport association or an enterprise, an image right 
agreement would typically provide for the licensing of a right to use an image in 
advertising for a specific period in a defined assignment.  
Image rights payments are products of the productive employment of sportspersons’ 
images (capital assets) in promotional activities. The amounts received by, accrued 
to, or in favour of sportspersons in respect of image rights satisfy the requirements of 
the “gross income” definition as envisaged in section 1 of the ITA. The income 
generated is classified as income of a revenue nature and should be included in the 
sportspersons’ gross income.  
The prospect of recognising image rights payments as restraint of trade payments was 
examined. It was determined that restraints of trade are specifically designed to protect 
proprietary interests such as goodwill, confidential trade secrets and know how. In the 
context of the present study, image rights payments are either made by sport clubs, 
national sport associations or enterprises. None of the respective parties who make 
image rights’ payments possesses proprietary interest in a sportsperson’s image right. 
Moreover, the restraint provisions stipulated in the image rights regulations prescribed 
by sport governing bodies do not extend further than the common law duty not to 
compete or cause harm (bare covenant not to compete). Sportspersons are able to 
conclude other image rights agreements if such agreements do not cause harm or a 
direct competition to an existing agreement. A sportsperson’s asset is therefore not 
sterilised by concluding an image right agreement. Image rights payments are 
therefore not considered as restraint of trade payments.   
As discussed in Chapter 5, the 2018 Guide is consistent with the findings of this study 
with regard to the classification of income generated from commercial exploitation of 
image rights. However, the following deficiencies were noted in the 2018 Guide:  
• It does not guide the reader about the precedential test or guideline laid down 





• It overlooks the fact that image rights payments are also made by national sport 
associations. 
• It lacks discussion on the characterisation of income, save for when a payment 
is made by a sport club.  
• It lacks guidance on the income tax consequences when a facet of image 
exploited is protected under the intellectual property law.  
Since the 2018 Guide is not sufficiently comprehensive on the aspect of image rights, 
it fails to alleviate uncertainty about the classification of income generated from the 
commercial exploitation of image rights. However, the 2018 Guide serves as a good 
foundation in a quest to bring certainty on the image rights phenomenon. Based on 
the findings of this study and the deficiencies identified in the 2018 Guide, it is 
suggested that the legislation should be explicit on the issue of image rights. The 
legislators can formulate and include a definition of image right in the income tax 
legislation. Furthermore, the SARS should release a document in a form of a revised 
Guide or Interpretation Note to provide clarity and incorporate factors such as the 
various ways in which image rights are exploited, the regulations prescribed by sports 
bodies, the characterisation of income and the use of intellectual property statutes to 
protect image rights and the implications from the subsequent exploitation thereof.  
In Chapter 6 an international perspective was presented with the focus on the image 
rights practice and income tax treatment in the UK and USA. In these two jurisdictions 
image rights are regarded as disposable proprietary rights. Hence, sportspersons can 
utilise structures such as IRC or trusts to execute the commercial exploitation of their 
image rights. This is contrary to the position in South Africa wherein image rights are 
classified as non-disposable or inseparable personal rights. It is therefore not practical 
to align the South African income tax treatment of image rights with that of the UK or 
USA. It is clear that further study is necessary to determine whether image rights could 
be recognised as some form of proprietary right before adoption of the UK or US 
practice. The South African practice can only be comparable with these jurisdictions 







Annexure A: Extract of the Guide 
Introduction 
South African sports players are, like their overseas counterparts, enjoying the benefit 
of being able to exploit other commercial opportunities such as image licensing 
agreements, celebrity endorsements and appearance fees. Image licensing 
agreements involve the commercial exploitation of a player’s image, such as the use 
of the player’s name, photograph, reputation, voice, signature, initials or nickname. 
Image rights are the legal rights associated with using the image of a sportsperson in 
marketing or promotional activities. Image rights payments refer to the payments that 
a player receives from an enterprise that uses such player’s image for advertising purposes. 
Income tax implications 
Talented sportspersons receive sums of money to appear in, amongst others, 
television and print advertisements, as well as appearances at social gatherings. The 
sportsperson’s participation is usually intended to promote the sale of a product or 
products, or an event, owing to the perception or “image” that the public has of the 
sportsperson. 
Image rights are essentially personal rights that are vested in the player as an individual 
person. These rights cannot be separated from the sportsperson, and consequently, 
cannot be disposed of or “sold” to another person. Further, “a sportsperson has a 
proprietary interest in his identity and an infringement of such personality right caused 
by unlawful commercial exploitation can lead to economic loss.” 
The Tax Court was called upon in ITC 1735 to decide whether a payment made to a 
famous golfer for the right to use his name, likeness and biographical material for 
promotional purposes was of a revenue or capital nature. The court held that: 
“The appellant by allowing his name and reputation to be used did not dispose of such 
assets and continued to possess them after the tournament and after he received the 
agreed consideration for allowing them to be used for publicizing the Tournament. In 
our opinion there can be no doubt that the payment was not of a capital nature and was 
the type of income that a professional golfer would expect to earn for participating in a 
golf tournament that traded on the reputation of the participants. Accordingly the monies 




It is clear therefore that payments made to a sportsperson for the right to use the 
sportsperson’s “image” rights will be included in the sportsperson’s gross income and 
will be taxable as such. 
Should such a payment be made to a sportsperson by the club to whom the 
sportsperson is contracted, such payments will constitute “remuneration” for 
employees’ tax purposes. Since the amount paid to the sportsperson for the 
exploitation of the sportsperson’s “image” rights is in these circumstances paid by an 
“employer” (the club) to an “employee” (the sportsperson) as contemplated in the 
Fourth Schedule to the Act, the club is obliged to withhold employees’ tax and the 
amount paid for the use of the sportsperson’s “image” rights must be disclosed on the 
sportsperson’s IRP5. 
The same treatment will apply to endorsement fees and appearance fees, as all three 
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